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FIRST SESSION

GORBACHEV, "GLASNOST" AND EASTERN EUROPE

JUNE 18, 1987

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PUBLIC HEARING: GORBACHEV, "GLASNOST" AND EASTERN EUROPE

THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1987

Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 124, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, at 10 a.m., Representative Steny H. Hoyer (chairman) and Senator Dennis DeConcini (cochairman) presiding.

In attendance from the Commission: Representative Christopher H. Smith, Senators Frank Lautenberg and James McClure.

Also in attendance: Samuel G. Wise, staff director and Mary Sue Hafner, deputy staff director and general counsel.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HOYER

Chairman **Hoyer**. We want to welcome you to this hearing on "Glasnost" and Eastern Europe.

I want to welcome our witnesses here and say how pleased we are to have them with us.

Our subject, as I said, is the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms on Eastern Europe. It is a subject of many dimensions and consequences.

Consider the situation in East Germany. This is a nation that used to trumpet every word and deed of Soviet leaders. Not so, however, with Mr. Gorbachev. The official party newspaper gave only a terse summary of his January Central Committee speech. And his recent meeting with East German party leader Erich Honecker received only a bland 4-sentence dispatch.

An incident in East Berlin last week may explain why. Hundreds of young East Berliners who were eavesdropping on a West Berlin rock concert clashed with police in the most serious outbreak of public discontent in nearly 10 years. And what was their battle cry? "Gorbachev, Gorbachev, the wall must go."

In an ironic twist, a Soviet leader has become for some at least a symbol of redemption for the many East Europeans hungry for change. But to East European leaders fearful of change, Gorbachev's reforms are perhaps a Pandora's box to be opened only at great risk. Never far from consciousness is 1956 in Hungary, and 1968 in Czechosolvakia, and Solidarity in 1981.

"Glasnost" in Eastern Europe is also haunted by a shadow of Khrushchev. No matter how appealing reform may be, what leader would want to risk hitching his nation to Gorbachev—with the chance that Gorbachev might be deposed and his reforms reversed, weakened, or discredited?

We need to ask a number of questions about Gorbachev and Eastern Europe. How will Gorbachev's reforms affect economic and political relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? Will dissidents in Eastern Europe ironically use "glasnost" as a rallying cry against their own governments and Soviet domination? What does "glasnost" mean for the succession of Eastern Europe's aging leaders?

And what are the opportunities for us here in the United States? Is reform in Eastern Europe part of Moscow's plan to split Western Europe from the United States? Is it designed to gain valuable Western credits and technology? Or, on the other hand, is it a chance to bridge the gap between America and Eastern Europe and reduce East-West tensions?

The Commission maintains a very keen interest in Eastern Europe. By October we hope to have participated in Commission delegation meetings in every Eastern European country. We want to work closely with these nations in the CSCE process. "Glasnost" is bound to have an impact in Eastern Europe and indeed is having an impact in Eastern Europe, perhaps a decisive one. That this is why we are holding this hearing. And I look forward to the words and insights of our very distinguished witnesses.

Before recognizing our Cochairman, I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome to the Commission hearings three very distinguished parliamentarians who are with us.

Mr. Jan Petersen from Norway, the Rapporteur of the Subcommittee on Eastern Europe of the North Atlantic Assembly. The North Atlantic Assembly is an arm of the North Atlantic Alliance, composed of parliamentarians from each of the signatory states to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. Petersen is the Chairman of the Foreign and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and has been a member of that committee since 1985.

He's also a member of the Nordic Council. And was first elected to the Norwegian Parliament in 1981.

Also with us, and we welcome him, is Mr. Andrew Witer, a Member of the House of Commons from Canada. We appreciate his attendance.

Next, Mr. Ismail Sengun from Turkey, a member of the Free Democratic Party and a member of the Budget and Planning Committee of the National Assembly to which he was elected in 1983.

Senator DeConcini and I want to welcome all three of these distinguished parliamentarians to these hearings. We know of their deep interest in the CSCE process, the Helsinki Final Act. And we look forward to working closely with them as we focus on this decisive issue and many others as well.

So, we welcome you with us.

I also want to welcome David Hobbs, who is Director of Committees and Studies. We appreciate his attendance as well.

At this time, I'd like to recognize the distinguished Cochairman from Arizona, Senator DeConcini.

STATEMENT OF COCHAIRMAN DENNIS DeCONCINI

Cochairman DeConcini. Mr. Chairman, thank you for those introductions, particularly our guest parliamentarians and our outstanding list of witnesses today.

I join you in a real genuine welcome for their encouragement to come forward and give us their observation on "glasnost" and Eastern Europe.

As we on the Commission continue to hold the Soviet and East European signatories to the Helsinki accords publicly accountable for their flagrant abuse of rights, we must also continue to monitor any apparent policy shifts in the Soviet Union which might affect the lives of people like Vladimir Sleypak or Benjamin Charney or any of the thousands of others in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who are struggling for basic human rights.

Does "glasnost" represent a substantive shift towards true openness or is it merely a tactical move designed to animate a passive population numbed by years of repression—a population which must be roused if the Soviet Union's dangerously stagnant economy is to make any positive progress?

Few of us doubt anything more than a tactical effort is involved here.

The question we must examine today is what effect, indeed, intended or otherwise will "glasnost" have, not just on the Soviet Union but on the other Warsaw Pact countries.

The leader of Poland, has already engaged in the precarious exercise of balancing his country's need for economic reform against the dictates of the Communist party. Could "glasnost" tip the scale too far beyond what is acceptable to Moscow? A question that I think needs to be discussed. The Solidarity movement, although officially banned, is still not only smouldering but, indeed, I think growing.

This also holds true in Romania. In Czechoslovakia the leaders do not seem ready to embrace a policy which could possibly recall to their detriment the Prague spring.

If the recent rock concert riots in East Germany were an example of how that country's citizens are interpreting "glasnost," the Government's reluctance to implement the policy is quite understandable when we see the spirit and the hope of freedom coming forward.

As Gorbachev calls for greater economic integration among the Eastern bloc countries, how will this affect both Eastern Germany and Hungary, who have been experimenting with economic reforms on a level which Moscow could not begin to approach under its current system?

Mr. Chairman, I have to chair some hearings in the Judiciary Committee for Senator Kennedy on the Salvadoran voluntary departure bill that Congressman Moakley and I are cosponsoring in each of our Houses. I will have to leave.

I want to thank you for your leadership in having a series of hearings on this subject matter. And I want to thank the witnesses and our fellow parliamentarians for being with us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Hoyer. Thank you.

Now, I would like to introduce Senator Frank Lautenberg from New Jersey, a member of the Commission, active leader in the area of human rights and the Helsinki process.

Senator Lautenberg.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK LAUTENBERG FROM NEW JERSEY

Mr. **Lautenberg**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be with you to join in welcoming our witnesses today, people who have devoted themselves to the cause of human rights, going way beyond their professional involvement, but induced by their concern for our fellow man to be here. And I am grateful that you took the trouble and the time to be with us.

Everybody is interested, fascinated I might say by the concept of "glasnost."

What does it really mean? We hear that the people in the Soviet Union are having as much trouble understanding it as we do over here.

There is an anecdote that I have heard going around Moscow about the man who went to the doctor and asked to see two specialists, one ear, nose, and throat, and the other an eye doctor.

And he was asked why he needed two. He said because I don't see what I hear.

The fact of the matter is that we don't see what we hear either.

Many of us are wondering what the objective of the mission is in advertising "glasnost." Is it really a diversionary thing? Are we going to talk about the word, the definition? Or are we going to talk about serious programs to lighten up and permit the human rights experience to really move into place.

I come from the State of New Jersey. New Jersey has many communities with people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Many are from Eastern Europe. They include Poles and people of Polish extractions, Hungarians, Lithuanians, and other Eastern European relationships. They care very deeply about the fate and future of those who are left behind in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.

"Glasnost" may or may not have a real impact on their lives and the lives of their loved ones.

There are many different answers to the questions that are going to be raised. But the opportunity to ask questions and to learn more about it is a valuable one.

We will be traveling this summer to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. And we will have a chance perhaps to get the answers firsthand from those who desire or who have yet to experience the real significance of the "glasnost" policy.

But meanwhile we are very interested in hearing from those of you who have either studied or experienced the policies of the day. And we will be richer for the knowledge.

And, once again, Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding these hearings, and thank the witnesses for their willingness to be with us today.

Chairman **Hoyer**. Thank you, Senator.

I am going to take this opportunity to introduce all three of the witnesses. And then we will recognize you in alphabetical order, I think just the way we have it done.

You heard the beeper beep. So, I will be leaving for a vote. But I will come right back.

But I want to introduce three very distinguished witnesses. First of all, Raymond L. Garthoff, who is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He received his B.A. from Princeton University and his master's and Ph.D. from Yale University. From 1977 to 1979, Mr. Garthoff served as U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria.

I might say, Mr. Ambassador, we hope to be visiting Bulgaria this coming August or September.

Prior to this posting, he served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the SALT I negotiations, the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Regional Political and Military Affairs, and Counselor at the U.S. mission to NATO, and a Senior Foreign Service Inspector.

Ambassador Garthoff is the author of several books and articles on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including "Detente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan," published by Brookings in 1985.

Next, Professor Ken Jowitt of the political science department at the University of California in Berkeley.

He received his B.A. from the Columbia University and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley.

Professor Jowitt was named Distinguished University Teacher in 1983 and served as dean of freshmen and sophomore studies from 1983 to 1986.

His main research areas include theories of social change and the comparison of Leninist regimes.

His publications include "Images of Detente and Soviet Political Order," in 1977; and "The Leninists' Response to National Dependency," in 1978.

Next, Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, who is an associate professor of political science at Tufts and a fellow of Harvard's Russian Research Center.

She received her B.A. from Cornell University, and her M.A. from Radcliffe Graduate School, and her Ph.D. from Harvard University.

Professor Terry was awarded the 1983 George Louis Beer Prize in European international history by the American Historical Association for her book "Poland's Place in Europe," which was published in 1983.

Her other publications include "Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe," which she edited; "The 27th CPSU Congress and Eastern Europe," published in 1985 for Radio Liberty; and "What Gorbachev Means for Eastern Europe," published in 1986; and "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Implications for U.S. Policy," published in 1985.

It is evident that all of these witnesses are well qualified to speak on this most timely topic. As Senator Lautenberg said, the West is fascinated indeed by the topic, perhaps so fascinated that the polls seem to reflect a much different attitude towards a Soviet leader than historically we have seen.

Before recognizing our witnesses, I'd like to recognize Congressman Chris Smith, also from the State of New Jersey—New Jersey is well represented here today—a member of the Commission, and I might say one of the hardest working, most committed members of this Commission.

Congressman Smith.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH FROM NEW JERSEY

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank you for calling this hearing.

To return that compliment, having traveled with you to Prague and Vienna and having worked with you on the Commission, there is no finer chairman in the House or Senate. You do an exemplary job on behalf of the Commission and I want to commend you for that.

Mr. Chairman, Secretary General Gorbachev has initiated one of the most noted public image campaigns witnessed by the Soviet people and the world in the last half century.

Only time and intense scrutiny will reveal what "glasnost" really means. "Glasnost," however, is not a new word or idea to be used in the Soviet political context.

Mr. Chairman, as early as 1919 Lenin himself used and manipulated this word when he sought to ease some of the Communist bureaucracy at the time. Although he permitted certain free market activities, eased some political restrictions, and even allowed a few private publishing houses and art groups to function, these freedoms were entirely snuffed out with the consolidation of power and the beginning of Stalin's reign of terror.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that "glasnost" will translate into the toleration of religious practice and the end to methodical discrimination and harassment of people of faith.

Mr. Chairman, we can hope that the policy of "glasnost" will reverse the restrictions which have been imposed on Soviet citizens who desire to immigrate, especially those Soviet Jews who have been longing to join their families in Israel or in the West.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, only 16 days following the "glasnost" initiative an announcement was made on February 12 by the OVIR, the Moscow visa office, that eight individuals were prohibited from immigrating because of their past employment, which allegedly gave them access to state secrets.

In actual fact, most of those refuseniks had first applied over a decade ago and pose no threat whatsoever to the Soviet state.

Just yesterday, I was joined by 69 of our colleagues in introducing a resolution regarding not only these eight and their families, but all Soviet Jews who are wishing to exercise their right to immigrate.

Clearly, Mr. Chairman, if the word "glasnost" and the commitment of the Soviet Union to openness is to have any meaning at all, they cannot continue to deprive Soviet Jews of their basic human rights.

On another humanitarian plane, Mr. Chairman, we can hope that "glasnost" will also mean the termination of the severe limitations which are placed on the Soviet citizens' right to travel abroad. This is especially important in the case of families wishing to visit with their relatives.

With about 5 million Americans who have familial ties in and trace their origins to lands now part of the Soviet Union, there are countless relatives who would give their life savings to travel and visit one another if only they were allowed to by the Soviet Government.

Mr. Chairman, a number of our colleagues on the Commission have joined our fellow Commissioner Senator DeConcini and myself as cosponsors of a resolution which we introduced in both the House and Senate emphasizing the importance of and urging the Soviet Union to respect the right of unrestricted family visits.

We also hope, Mr. Chairman, that "glasnost" means the end of the use of psychiatric hospitals to punish and to torture political dissidents and religious believers.

It has been reported that there are a total of 13 special psychiatric hospitals administered by the Minister of Internal Affairs, special psychiatric colonies for treatment of those in labor camps, and other general psychiatric hospitals throughout the country, which are used to detain and to treat dissidents arbitrarily.

How can Mr. Gorbachev expect to have democratization of government officials if constructive political debate is not allowed?

I would suggest that only a weak and insecure political system crushes dissent in such a brutal and inhumane manner.

Mr. Chairman, finally, the people living in the Soviet Union, I believe, are a very proud and a very noble people. They deserve better than absolute tyranny and terror.

Perhaps—and it's a big perhaps—Mr. Gorbachev's "glasnost" will mean an easing of these restrictions and the opening of a new society in the Soviet Union.

We can hope. But we cannot forget to assess the progress with the litmus test of real freedoms, the freedoms of thought, movement, religious faith, and political debate which must be enjoyed by all Soviet citizens.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. I thank Mr. Smith for his opening statement.

Now, to the witnesses, let me apologize. Congressman Smith and I are now going to leave. But we're coming right back. And the reason being because you can't really schedule these votes. And, so, when the buzzer rings, you show up. We're sort of like a Pavlov dog, a little bit, in that respect.

Senator Lautenberg will chair the hearing. Senator, if we can start with Ambassador Garthoff.

We'll return as quickly as possible.

Chairman LAUTENBERG. With the instruction from the previous chairman still firmly in mind, we invite you to present your testimony.

OK. I just wanted to confirm whether or not the practice in this kind of a hearing is similar to those that we hold interminably around this place. And I am told that you have time to make your full statement, though we would encourage you to summarize as often as you can, because of the pressure of time.

And welcome once again. Ambassador Garthoff, you're first.

STATEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, PROFESSORS KEN JOWITT AND SARAH M. TERRY

Mr. **Garthoff**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am happy to be here. And I would like to say that I think it's a very desirable thing that the Commission should hold hearings on this subject. It is one that is of growing importance for the United States.

As we meet, His Holiness Pope John Paul II has just concluded a remarkable visit to his native land, Poland. His presence and encouragement evoked wide hopes in that country and elsewhere. No less significant was the fact that the Polish Government was able to and did accept his visit. While the Pope embodied and evoked an idealism that stirs many, the Polish Government and its authority represents a reality that both the Pope and the Polish people must recognize.

Communist rule in the six countries of East and Central Europe lying west of the Soviet Union has now been a reality for four decades. Yet there have been enormous differences in the nature of the regimes of each of these countries over time and from country to country, including also the Soviet Union.

Today, significant changes are underway, not least in the Soviet Union, that importantly affect the future development of each of these countries. While we cannot predict their outcome, we can predict that they will occur and will affect relationships between the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

They will also affect relationships with the countries of Western Europe and the United States. While the West cannot directly or basically influence the nature of those societies or governments, it can indirectly and at least marginally do so. Among the Western countries, the United States is predominant in relations with the Soviet Union, but is not comparably central in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe.

One reason that American policy and influence is not predominant in Eastern Europe is that the security component of the relationship is less central than in relations with the Soviet Union. The two military superpowers unavoidably have the dominant role in any question concerning military security between themselves and between the two alliances—in deterrence of each other, and in strategic arms control. That element remains central, indeed almost exclusive, in their relationship. But as between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, and even the relations of each to the other superpower, other considerations loom larger. They are, after all, European and not only Western or Eastern European, or for that matter Communist and non-Communist. Moreover, too often Americans see Europe as a theater for confrontation or for engagement, but a theater nonetheless. For Europeans, East and West, it is not a theater of operations, but home.

The Helsinki process has helped to create this feeling of a broader European relationship. We, of course, the United States and Canada, also participate fully in this process. And aided by the work of this Commission, we can participate actively and constructively. We do so most effectively when we seek to participate rather than to manage, and when we regard Europe as the center of a socio-historical process and not as a theater of operations—whether for cold war or for any global East-West conflict or crusade.

The advent of a dynamic and imaginative new leadership in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev is making a great difference. We should welcome and encourage his policies of "perestroika" and "glasnost," not because it is our business who runs the Soviet Union, not to help any particular leadership as the matter is sometimes posed, but because any increased openness in contacts serves the interests of us all. Whether one approaches the matter from the standpoint of United States' interests, our ultimate touchstone, or the interests of advancing the Helsinki process, relaxation of tension, and the interests of human rights and greater political pluralism in Eastern Europe, there is a congruence on this point. More will be accomplished with reduced tensions.

As the very names of the Helsinki Final Act and of this Commission bear witness, there are two fundamental purposes of the process: security and cooperation. Security is fundamental, but not exclusive. Moreover, security is not only military but a much broader conception affecting not only elements of power but of political, economic, and human and humanitarian relationships.

One of the most significant aspects of the new leadership in Moscow has been its avowal of a new approach to the very concept of security. Gorbachev has not only declared that no state can provide its own security, by defense or deterrence, and that the task of ensuring security increasingly is a political task and can be resolved only by political means, he also has placed a stress on global interdependence in political, economic, ecological, humanitarian, and other respects as well as military terms.

Of course, what counts is what Gorbachev's words mean in practice in terms of Soviet developments at home, relations with Eastern Europe, with the United States, and with the rest of the world. But enough has already happened to make clear that there is more here than merely words. And that is where we come in. No country, not the United States nor the Soviet Union, can carryout a policy, above all a policy of greater cooperation, alone. Ultimately the degree of constructive development in Soviet foreign policy will depend not only on the readiness of the Soviet leaders but also on the actions of ourselves and others. The United States should and no doubt will be prudent and cautious about accepting Soviet avowals of desire to improve relations. What is less clear is whether we will also provide an opportunity to test and determine how far the Soviet Union will go in arms reductions, for the leading example, and in other respects. We need not base our policy on assumptions that the Soviets are sincere in seeking reductions of arms and tensions; we do need to show that if they are, so are we.

Others testifying will speak more directly to recent and prospective developments in Eastern Europe and in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. I would like to stress that policies are based on interests, and that the primary Soviet interest in Eastern Europe is to serve its own security. The more that the Soviet leaders perceive a threat to their security developing, the more strongly they will act to prevent that threat from arising, even if that again is seen to require a reluctant resort to the use of force. That outcome would not be in the interests of anyone—the Soviets, ourselves, or least of all the East Europeans.

The other side of that same coin is that as long as their security requirements are not challenged the Soviet leaders can permit more autonomous developments by each East European nation. Today, the leaders and peoples of Eastern Europe are being urged to revitalize their systems, as the Soviet leaders are seeking to do in the Soviet Union itself.

The American-borrowed shorthand term, as evidenced in the subject of the present hearing, is "glasnost." This reflects the change most noticed and judged most notable in the West—greater openness in publicity and expression. "Glasnost" is not, however, the central concept in the new thinking urged by Gorbachev and his colleagues. It is an instrument, almost a symptom, of the change.

The key conception is "perestroika," usually literally rendered as restructuring, and usually thought of as a euphemism for economic reform. A more felicitous translation would be transformation or, best of all, reformation. Gorbachev is attempting a reformation of the whole Soviet system. This includes considerable attention to the economic system (which badly needs revitalization).

Another key slogan is "uskorenie," or acceleration, underlining the perceived need for urgent action.

"Perestroika" also includes "demokratisatsiya," democratization, the least clear and most radical element of Gorbachev's program: political reform. We should not expect Western liberal democracy. Gorbachev and his colleagues remain dedicated Leninist Communists. They do not intend to dispense with a centralized economic and political system. But they are calling for its fundamental reformation and are introducing many unprecedented ameliorizations.

A striking illustration of this was the response that the Soviet Government press spokesman made in Prague when asked the difference between Dubcek's reforms and avowal of socialism with a human face and Gorbachev's approach. His very revealing off-the-cuff reply was: "19 years."

The impact of economic and political reform, with greater openness and wider uncontrolled expression, moreover undertaken with some urgency, is unsettling to many in the Soviet Union in this 70th year of Communist rule. It's impact in Eastern Europe is far less predictable and, in many ways, is risky. It could lead to a political explosion. That would certainly have arresting and probably sharply reversing effects on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, and on Soviet policy at home, and perhaps on the composition of the Soviet leadership. While constituting a sharp loss for Soviet policy, it would probably also mark a serious loss for Eastern Europe. It would not mark a gain for the United States.

What should American policy be? I believe U.S. policy should continue essentially on the same track it has followed with variation for the past quarter century, but with greater flexibility at this time of flux in the East. While the policy has had various names, from "bridge-building" to "differentiation," it may best be capsulized perhaps as "constructive engagement." We should continue to support the Helsinki process and engagement both with the governments and the peoples of Eastern Europe.

Security remains a cardinal shared interest of all parties. While we vary somewhat in our interpretations of the best means to ensure security, the avoidance of war and reduction of arms and tensions is a common aim. There appear to be new opportunities for arms reductions and confidence-building measures. We in the United States and the West should at least be prepared actively to do our part. The Western powers should not only consult closely and react positively to promising Soviet initiatives, we should also take the initiative and formulate arms control programs that will contribute to Western and overall European security. The United States can play a leading role in this process and should do so. If the Western countries act in concert on the basis laid down by the alliance 20 years ago in the Harmel Report, building on twin pillars of defense and detente, we need not fear being divided by Soviet proposals.

In areas of economic, cultural, and human contact, the United States should be more active in constructive engagement. There are economic reasons underlying greater West-East European trade and cultural commerce, but the United States has chosen to limit its influence still more by such unilateral policies as trade discrimination. The United States would strengthen its influence in Eastern Europe by abandoning the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments. We might for economic and political reasons be restrained in granting credits to facilitate trade, but we are not showing ourselves exemplars of the Helsinki process with its call for facilitating trade and contacts by imposing discriminatory restraints. Nor do we gain influence by reducing our economic leverage in Eastern Europe vis-a-vis our West European and Japanese trade competitors.

In conclusion, I would stress the need for the United States to serve its own national interests and those of the European and world communities by working together with our Western European allies in more constructive engagement across the board with the countries of Eastern Europe in a way that may compete more effectively with the Soviet Union for influence without challenging its security interests in a way that provokes confrontation that can serve no one's interest.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Prepared statement of Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff follows:]

Statement by Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff,
Brookings Institution, before the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

June 18, 1987

Soviet Policy, Eastern Europe, and American Policy

As we meet, His Holiness Pope John Paul II has just concluded a remarkable visit to his native land, Poland. His presence and encouragement evoked wide hopes in that country. No less significant was the fact that the Polish Government was able to, and did, accept his visit. While the Pope embodied and evoked an idealism that stirs many, the Polish Government and its authority represents a reality that both the Pope and the Polish people must recognize.

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One reason that American policy and influence is not predominant in Eastern Europe is that the security component of the relationship is less central than in relations with the Soviet Union. The two military superpowers unavoidably have the dominant role in any question concerning military security between themselves and between the two alliances--in deterrence of each other, and in strategic arms control. That element remains central, indeed almost exclusive, in their relationship. But as between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe, and even the relations of each to the other superpower, other considerations loom much larger. They are, after all, European and not only "Western" or "Eastern" European, or for that matter communist and non-communist. Moreover, too often Americans see Europe as a theater for confrontation, or for engagement, but a theater nonetheless. For Europeans, East and West, it is not a theater of operations, but home.

The Helsinki process has helped to create this feeling of a broader European relationship. We, of course, the United States and Canada, also participate fully in this process. And aided by the work of this Commission, we can participate actively and constructively. We do so most effectively when we seek to participate rather than to manage, and when we regard Europe as the center of a socio-historical process and not as a theater of operations--whether for cold war, or for any global East-West conflict or crusade.

The advent of a dynamic and imaginative new leadership in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev is making a great difference. We should welcome and encourage his policies of perestroika and glasnost', not because it is our business who runs the Soviet Union, and not to "help" any particular leadership as the matter is sometimes posed, but because any increased openness in contacts serves the interests of us all. Whether one approaches the matter from the standpoint of United States' interests, our ultimate touchstone, or the interests of advancing the Helsinki process, relaxation of tension, and the interests of human rights and greater political pluralism in Eastern Europe, there is a congruence on this point. More will be accomplished with reduced tensions.

As the very names of the Helsinki Final Act, and of this Commission, bear witness, there are two fundamental purposes of the process: security and cooperation. Security is fundamental, but not exclusive. Moreover, security is not only military, but a much broader conception affecting not only elements of power but of political, economic, and human and humanitarian relationships.

One of the most significant aspects of the new leadership in Moscow has been its avowal of a new approach to the very concept of security. Gorbachev has not only declared that no state can provide its own security, by defense or deterrence, and that "the task of ensuring security increasingly is a political task and can be resolved only by political means." He also has placed a stress on global interdependence in political, economic, ecological and other respects as well as in military terms. Accordingly, since the Party Congress in Moscow in early 1986 the Soviet leadership has called for creation of a comprehensive system of international security--military, political, economic and humanitarian.

Of course, what counts is what Gorbachev's words mean in practice, in terms of Soviet relations with Eastern Europe, with the United States, and with the rest of the world. But enough has already happened to make clear that there is more here than merely words. And that is where we come in. No country, not the United States nor the Soviet Union, can carry out a policy, above all a policy of greater cooperation, alone. Ultimately the degree of constructive development in Soviet foreign policy will depend not only on the readiness of the Soviet leaders but also on the actions of ourselves and others. The United States should, and no doubt will, be prudent and cautious about accepting Soviet avowals of desire to improve relations. What is less clear is whether we will provide an opportunity to test and determine how far the Soviet Union will now go--in arms reductions, for the leading example, and in other respects. We need not base our policy on assumptions that the Soviets are sincere in seeking reduction of arms and tensions; we do need to show that _if_ they are, so are we.

Others testifying will speak more directly to recent and prospective developments in Eastern Europe, and in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. I would like to stress that policies are based on interests, and that the primary Soviet interest in Eastern Europe is to serve its own security. The more that the Soviet leaders perceive a threat to their security developing, the more strongly they will act to prevent that threat from arising, even if that again is seen to require reluctant resort to the use of force. That outcome would not be in the interests of anyone--the Soviets, ourselves, or least of all the East Europeans.

The other side of that same coin is that as long as their security requirements are not challenged, the Soviet leaders can permit more autonomous developments by each Eastern European nation. Today, the leaders and peoples of Eastern Europe are being urged to revitalize their systems, as the Soviet leaders are seeking to do in the Soviet Union itself.

The American-borrowed shorthand term, as evidenced in the subject of the present Hearing, is _glasnost'_. This reflects the change most noticed, and judged most notable, in the West--greater "openness" in publicity and expression. _Glasnost'_ is not, however, the central concept in the "new thinking" urged by Gorbachev and his colleagues--it is an instrument, almost a symptom, of the change. The key conception is _perestroika_, usually literally rendered as "restructuring," and usually thought of as a euphemism for economic reform. A more felicitous translation would be "transformation," or best of all "reformation." Gorbachev is attempting a "reformation" of the whole Soviet system. This includes considerable attention to the economic system (which badly needs revitalization). Another key slogan is _uskorenie_, or "acceleration," underlining the perceived need for urgent action. _Perestroika_ also includes _demokratisatsiya_ or "democratization," the least clear and most radical element of Gorbachev's program: political reform. We should not expect Western liberal democracy. Gorbachev and his colleagues remain dedicated Leninist Communists, and they do not intend to dispense with a centralized economic and political system. But they are calling for its fundamental "reformation," and are introducing many unprecedented ameliorizations.

The impact of economic and political, reform, with greater openness and wider uncontrolled expression, moreover undertaken with some urgency, is unsettling to many in the Soviet Union in this seventieth year of communist rule. Its impact in Eastern Europe is far less predictable and, in many ways, is risky. It could lead to a political explosion. That would certainly have arresting and probably sharply reversing effects on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, and on Soviet policy at home, and perhaps on the composition of the Soviet leadership. While constituting a sharp loss for Soviet policy, it would probably also mark a serious loss for Eastern Europe. It would not mark a gain for the United States.

What should American policy be? I believe U.S. policy should continue essentially on the same track it has followed for the past quarter century, but with greater flexibility at this time of flux in the East. While the policy has had various names, from "bridge-building" to "differentiation," it may best be capsulized as "constructive engagement." We should continue to support the Helsinki process, and engagement both with the governments and the peoples of Eastern Europe.

Security remains a cardinal shared interest of all parties. While we vary somewhat in our interpretations of the best means to ensure security, the avoidance of war and reduction of arms and tensions is a common aim. There appear to be new opportunities for arms reductions and confidence-building-measures. We, in the United States and the West, should at least be prepared actively to do our part. The Western powers should not only consult closely and react positively to promising Soviet initiatives, we should take the initiative and formulate arms control programs that will contribute to Western, and overall European, security. The United States can play a leading role in this process, and should do so. If the Western countries act in concert, on the basis laid down by the alliance twenty years ago in the Harmel Report, building on twin pillars of defense and détente, we need not fear being divided by Soviet proposals.

In areas of economic, cultural, and human contact the United States should be more active in constructive engagement. There are economic reasons for greater West-East European trade and cultural commerce, but the United States has chosen to limit its influence still more by such unilateral policies as trade discrimination. The United States would strengthen its influence in Eastern Europe by abandoning the Jackson-Vanick and Stevenson amendments. We might for economic and political reasons be restrained in granting credits to facilitate trade, but we are not showing ourselves exemplars of the Helsinki process with its call for facilitating trade and contacts by imposing discriminatory restraints. Nor do we gain influence by reducing our own economic leverage in Eastern Europe vis-à-vis our

Western European and Japanese trade competitors.

In conclusion, I would stress the need for the United States to serve its own national interests, and those of the European and world communities, by working together with our Western European allies in more constructive engagement across the board with the countries of Eastern Europe in a way that may compete more effectively with the Soviet Union for influence without challenging its security interests in a way that provokes confrontation that can serve no one's interest.

Chairman LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Ambassador.

I'd like now to call on Dr. Jowitt for his testimony. Dr. Jowitt.

Mr. JOWITT. Thank you, sir.

Let me make two prefatory remarks. One is I'm used to speaking for 90 minutes to 700 students who all sit still. And that means that I'm going to have to engage in a little restructuring myself in your house.

Chairman LAUTENBERG. What's the reverse of "glasnost?"

Mr. JOWITT. The reverse of "glasnost" is called discipline.

Chairman LAUTENBERG. Thank you.

Mr. JOWITT. The other prefatory remark is that you will not be able to read along with me because I don't intend to repeat what I have already written.

Let me start with this observation. While basically liberal, Protestant, capitalist democracies provide the most consistent base for democracy and human rights, such rights can and have been supported to a significant degree in other types of regime. The question is whether Leninist regimes are capable of development in this direction. And the answer is yes.

If you distinguish between two types of change, one genetic, by which I mean change in the identity of a regime such as occurred in Germany from Nazi Germany to Liberal Germany; and development change, by which I mean changes that occur within Leninist regimes while they remain Leninist, then both types of changes can be pointed to in the history of Communist countries.

In Hungary in '56, Czechoslovakia in '68, and Poland in '80, '81, Leninist regimes had in effect given way to social democratic forces. That is to say basic change had occurred. It was a genetic change.

These successful national changes in Poland, Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia were externally reversed by the explicit and implicit aggression of the Soviet Union.

As for development change, beginning with Khrushchev's major revisions between '56 and '61, the Soviet Union and most other Leninist regimes have experienced in the last 30 years substantial significant changes while remaining Leninist.

They have subordinated their secret policies to party rule. And, most importantly, they have eliminated terror as a regular feature of their rule.

They are certainly despotic. They are not totalitarian.

In this connection, I consider Khrushchev's revisions in the nature of Leninist rule every bit as equivalent as those Aquinas brought about in the history of Catholicism or FDR brought about in the history of liberalism.

And as Khrushchev's direct descendent, I expect Gorbachev and his policy of "glasnost" to further enhance the civil but not political rights of the ruled in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Which raises the question of what Gorbachev's interest is in Eastern Europe.

Lots of reasons have been given why the Soviets find Eastern Europe important—economic reasons, military reasons, ideological reasons, and generational reasons. They're all important, and much less important than one single fact, particularly for Gorbachev. And that is East European happens to be European.

If you look at the Soviet leadership today, I think they're frightened by two things. They're frightened that the international expansion of Leninism that began in Outer Mongolia in 1921 may well have ended with the expansion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan in 1979.

In short, the Soviet leadership is afraid that the wave of history that it's supposed to be riding is really a backwater limited to the Third World. And, in retrospect, they may consider giving up half of Austria, of European Austrian, in the fifties, the biggest political and status mistake they ever made.

They'd probably now trade Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, and two or three draft choices for that half of Austria.

The fear that the Soviet leadership has today is that convergence is indeed happening, but the Soviet Union is converging with the Third World, not with us.

Gorbachev's major concern is to reorient the Soviet Union toward Europe. And that includes Eastern Europe and Western Europe, for technological reasons, for industrial reasons, for scientific, but also for cultural reasons.

If you look at what he's about, it's not just restructuring, it's just not "glasnost," it's not just democratization. What you hear over and over from Gorbachev is the need to exercise initiative within the Soviet Union, not to wait for instructions from above, in effect to exercise self-discipline.

What he wants to do is reorient the Soviet Union toward Western civilization without making it a liberal democracy.

And East Europe, particularly the northern part of Eastern Europe, happens to be very European.

I think Gorbachev needs in Eastern Europe and around the world, a placid not turbulent environment.

He does not want to see increasing violence in South Africa between the ANC and the Afrikaners. He does not want to see it between Iran-Iraq and the United States in the Gulf or Straits of Hormuz. And he most certainly does not want to see any violence, ethnic, national violence, between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania in Eastern Europe. Which means that in the short run Gorbachev is more or less satisfied with the way East Europe looks today.

Consider the regimes in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany selectively but genuinely support Gorbachev's rule.

Bulgaria pretends it does, which is better than overtly opposing it.

The Romanians overtly oppose it, but nevertheless need Soviet energy supplies, and do support Gorbachev's arms control proposals.

While Czechoslovakia, which is clearly threatened by reform, something Western academics point out weekly, I think Gorbachev is probably as sensitive to Czech weakness as professors in the United States.

If you look at his recent visit to Prague, he did not go there to demand that Husak toe the "glasnost" line. What he went there to do was demonstrate to Husak that he indeed does have power in the Soviet Union and will not tolerate opposition from people like Husak.

In fact, with respect to Gorbachev's attitude toward Eastern Europe I suggest the following. The more success he has domestically in building his power base, the less demanding he is going to be with respect to East Europeans following in some mimic-like fashion what's going on in the Soviet Union.

Rather, to the extent to which Gorbachev is able to build his power base in the Soviet Union, he's likely to combine selective critiques of East Europe regimes, a la his comments in Sofia to the Bulgarians and in Bucharest to the Romanians, with selective reassurance, such as Valentin Falin gave recently to the East Europeans when he pointed out the period when the Soviet Union would indiscriminately demand that East Europeans simply make believe they're Soviets is over. That was a tactical statement. But tactics count.

On the other hand, to the extent to which Gorbachev does not appear to be winning in the Soviet Union, he is much more likely to try to mobilize support from allies in Eastern Europe in the Polish, Hungarian, and East German party, which will mean the mobilization of opponents like Zhivkov, Husak, and Ceausescu, which in turn will create an extremely turbulent political universe in both the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, one which we would be better off, without.

There is also the possibility that events may occur in East European populations outside the control of either Gorbachev or the East European rulers, events triggered by a Pope's highly provocative comments in Poland or by a rock concert that can be heard in Eastern Berlin.

Should Gorbachev succeed in the Soviet Union with his "glasnost" reforms—and the democratization reform, a more important reform than "glasnost"—but to the extent to which "glasnost" succeeds, then I think you are going to see, in the near future, a Soviet Union that is much more demanding and much less understanding of nuance and difference in Eastern Europe.

But I think the demands he'll make on Eastern Europe are positive.

If his reforms do succeed in the Soviet Union, he will demand much more publicity, less secrecy and duplicity on the part of East European rulers.

He will not allow publics. And that's the fundamental flow of "glasnost," that is, publicity is not something you can have without publics. And publics are not allowed in the Soviet Union. Publics are independent groups of citizens outside of the confines of an authoritative state organization.

But that's simply saying that he's not going to allow liberal democracy. And I think we should all be aware of that by this time.

What in effect he will also ask for is a greater dispersion of power within the party. And that's another good thing.

It means the party will remain coercive and despotic, but much more accessible to wider segments of the East European populations, which is a good thing.

Still, I think that what everybody here has to realize is that should—and this is an open question—should Gorbachev succeed in his reforms, this in the shorter rather than the longer run is going to lead to enhanced political unrest in Eastern Europe. And I'd like to tell you why I think that's the case.

Under Brezhnev's rule, which lasted for almost 20 years, scavenger societies were created in Eastern Europe. I'll tell you what I mean by scavenger societies. The people aren't scavengers in their ethics or in their morals. They have been forced to act like scavengers by a regime that denies them any realm where they can engage in political articulation, organization, and action.

What's happened in the last 30 years in Eastern Europe is that mute, parochial, illiterate, inarticulate peasants have been changed into articulate, skilled, politically cognizant, urban dwellers.

These people know what politics is about. They have an interest in politics. And they are effectively precluded from having any effective role as citizens, which means they're forced to act as scavengers. They are forced to spend most of the time being self-regarding, following their private interest, being highly selfish, and being highly embarrassed and indignant at being forced into that role.

And that, I think, creates an enormous degree of potential turbulence and unrest in Eastern Europe on the part of these articular populations vis-a-vis their rulers.

I suggest that when that political unrest begins—and it's going to begin certainly in the next decade—that the United States had better adopt not only a critical but a prudent policy toward those disturbances, at least as critical and prudent as it did during Franco's life, when Spanish society started demanding some democracy. And at least as prudent as we're now showing in the light of demands in South Korea for greater democracy.

But all this raises the question of whether Gorbachev is going to succeed in his policy of "glasnost" and democratization. And the chances of his doing so are poor.

And here the economy is not the key. The party is the key. And the key event——

Chairman HOYER. I think you hit the microphone right at the key time.

Mr. JOWITT. The key event that's going to occur——

Chairman HOYER. No, no, no. The chances are poor?

Mr. JOWITT. Are very poor.

Remember, remind me to penalize this instrument.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. We thought it was an expletive deleted.

Mr. JOWITT. No. I include almost all of mine.

In any——

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Permitted to do so.

Mr. JOWITT. In any case, I think his chances are extremely poor. And the reason is, the major problem in the Soviet Union is not restructuring or tinkering with the efficiency of the economy, but Gorbachev has fully realized that the party has to be in very basic ways changed.

And here I think the party conference scheduled for '88 could well be one of the three most important events in Soviet history since the revolution.

The first being the 1920 Congress where factions were banned. The second being the 1956 Congress where de-Stalinization occurred.

And if I am right, what democratization means in the Soviet Union is a direct attack on the monopoly of power held within the party by the apparatus, by the full-time politicians who, in effect, run the party.

Khrushchev fell precisely at the time when he threatened to relativize the power of the party.

I suggested that Khrushchev's role in Leninism was equivalent to that of Aquinas' in the Roman Catholic Church. Khrushchev was kicked out when he appeared more like Luther than Aquinas, when he started in effect to say that party members, namely the laity, could have a role equal to that of the priests, namely the upper chiefs.

And I think the same fate faces Gorbachev should he pursue his efforts at democratization.

A failure by Gorbachev to "democratize" will reinforce what I see as the dominant tendency in the Soviet Union and in East European regimes. And that is an Ottoman Empire-like oscillation between periods of heightened corruption, slack party discipline, increasing cynicism and apathy on the part of the population, low productivity, and then on the other hand a period of limited, significant, but indecisive political reform.

The problem is that the Soviet Union is an Ottoman Empire with thermonuclear weapons.

And I suggest that it makes good sense for us to read just how Great Britain treated the Ottoman Empire when it was in a situation comparable to that of the Soviet Union.

Great Britain found it useful to make sure that the Ottoman Empire did not disintegrate internally in a violent way, because it could not only jeopardize Great Britain's interest, but the stability of the entire European—and in our instance the stability of the entire world.

We had better be prepared as much as Great Britain to, in effect, find selective, self-interested, and effective ways not just to enhance the policy of "glasnost," but to prevent the disintegration, the violent disintegration of the Soviet Union.

I've been asked—and if there's time, I'll be happy to do it—to comment on Romania, to say a little about a country that I know a great deal about.

So, let me say something briefly about both the Soviet and the American attitudes towards Romania today.

The Soviet attitude towards Romania is a compound of embarrassment, fear, and prudence.

The embarrassment is something people don't appreciate. The Soviets find this "socialism in one family" that characterizes Romania to be enormously embarrassing, equal to that of the North Korean regime. And they have demonstrated that. They have demonstrated that by putting an ideological watchdog as their ambassador, a man named Tiazhelnikov, and by refusing, in Gorbachev's trip to Bucharest recently, to give to Elena Ceausescu the status that every other country that Ceausescu visits does give.

They're also embarrased at the Pharaonic type of rule that Ceausescu has adopted.

This is a regime that is not only politically despotic, but in many respects politically psychotic.

You have a regime and you have a leader that is out to build a whole series of monuments to his person and rule while he's alive, build canals, build new cities, build new capitals, and, it being the 20th century, build new subways.

In any case, what he is doing I think is highly embarrassing to the Soviet Union and also produces a great deal of fear.

I think, and the Soviets may share this feeling, that there is a high potential for political convulsion in Romania.

I think that there could well be in the near future in Romania an urban jacquerie. That is to say an outpouring of rage and violence as frightening and murderous as the 1907 peasant jacquerie was in Romania.

Frankly, I'm sick and tired of the superficial and derogatory notion that Romanians have a passive, servile gene, which makes it impossible for them to do what heroic Poles and Hungarians do every 20 years.

The fact of the matter is, the most murderous, violent event in East European history, outside of World War II in the 20th century, was the peasant uprising in Romania.

And I'm suggesting that the reason why you haven't seen anything in Romania today is not because Romanians go around liking to make deals rather than nations. It's because there's absolutely no leverage in Romania for opposition to Ceausescu.

I could detail that. I'll be happy to do it if you wish to question me about it later.

But it has nothing to do with the cultural mentality of Romanians.

The Soviets have also been exceptionally prudent and I think very correct in their policy toward Romania recently. They have engaged in limited criticism about nepotism, the status of minorities, and the standard of living. They have also attempted to ameliorate the situation in Romania by providing energy supplies, without which this sort of turbulence I'm talking about may well have broken out, and which speaks to Gorbachev's overall international foreign policy.

He wants a placid world so that he can take care of business at home.

And, finally, the Soviets I think have encouraged the Romanians to speak to the Hungarians. There's been a recent delegation, a high level delegation from the Secretariat, that's visited and spoken to Szuros and others in Hungary. Because what the Soviets realize and what we had better realize is that should there be any degree of unrest or turbulence in Romania it will not only affect Romania, but has the very real potential and likelihood of spilling over to an ethnic-national conflict with Hungary, precisely because of the Hungarian issue within Romania.

And that is not something we want to be too lighthanded or irresponsible about. We've been lucky so far because every outburst in Eastern Europe has been limited to one country.

If something happens in Romania, it could immediately involve two countries, Hungary as well.

What about the United States and Romania? I advise ending most-favored-nation status for my least favorite regime.

I have been going there 20 years. Some people say it's perverse I spent my honeymoon in Romania. That was in '67, however, not in '87. My wife wouldn't go this year.

This is a regime that subjects its population to indignity, to privation, and to misery.

This is a population that is not terrorized. It's fatigued. It's exhausted. And it's embarrassed.

I would suggest that given the limited economic impact that MFN has on Romania our association with Romania is largely opportunistic and symbolic.

And I use the term opportunistic because it has both a negative and positive aspect. The positive is that in the late sixties and seventies Romania was very much like one of the families in "The Godfather." There's a small Mafia family, the Boccaccios. The Boccaccios couldn't be a major factor. So what they did was act as a safe house where the Correlonis and other powers could come together and settle their disputes.

Romania was the Boccaccios. Romania allowed Israelis to come and talk to Egyptians in Bucharest. They allowed Chinese to talk to American diplomats in Bucharest.

I'm suggesting they've exhausted their safe house role. They've got nothing to give us.

And the fact that they have relations with us is not due to MFN. It's due to the fact that they need us for some degree, minimal degree, of leverage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The opportunistic feature of our relationship to Romania is our notion that anything that upsets the Soviet Union is good for America, which is obviously wrong. What's bad for the Soviet Union is not automatically good for the United States.

And associating ourselves with the Romanian regime now is simply a symbolic gesture. And the symbol is negative.

The fact of the matter is, for the decent, for the skilled, and for the articulate people in Romania, who hold Romania's future in their hands, who can make Romania a country that's wealthy and has dignity, these people find our association with this regime repulsive and revulsive.

I suggest that the least we can do in our attitude toward Romania is have a policy similar to the Soviets, namely, sober, prudent, and critical.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Prepared Statement of Ken Jowitt, Professor of Political Science

18 June 1987

FOR: Commission on Security and Cooperation Europe

FROM: Ken Jowitt, Professor of Political Science
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Gorbachev, 'Glasnost', and Eastern Europe

1. Human rights as an issue and reality is intimately, if not absolutely connected with the reality of political democracy. Two things must be appreciated about mass political democracy: first, it is the historical exception not the rule. It has been limited to Western Europe/North America and a very few countries outside this area, countries subject to intensive influence by Western countries (e.g., Germany and Japan after World War II). Second, democracies appear in the aftermath of violence. In Western Europe it took a combination of Erasmian humanism, Calvinist intolerance, civil and military violence (e.g., the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the American War of Independence and the American Civil War) to "produce" Western liberalism. More recently, civil wars in mid-twentieth century Greece and Spain must be seen as crucial elements in the eventual creation of democratic governments in both countries in recent years.

Conclusion: liberal democratic development in the Soviet Union is unlikely in the absence of intense social and military violence that carries with it only the possibility, not the certainty, or even likelihood, of a Western democratic outcome.

2. Which is not to say that significant political reforms or the enhancement of human rights absolutely depend on the creation of liberal capitalist protestant democracies. The latter provide the most consistent, not the only, basis for human rights.

Governments that remove terror as a regular feature of their rule, and that attempt de facto to enhance the degree of predictability in their economic, political, and social operation do contribute substantially to human rights. This observation raises the question whether or not Leninist regimes are changeable, and the answer is yes.

We must distinguish between two types of change: change that is "genetic," and change that is developmental. By "genetic" I mean a change in a country's basic constitution (a change of identity)--e.g., from Nazi to Liberal Germany. By developmental I mean a substantial reorganization of a country's existing constitution. In Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland most of all, in 1980/1, it is evident that a change from a Leninist to a Social Democratic constitution was occurring. Soviet implicit and explicit aggression negated the fundamental political changes that HAD occurred in each of these countries.

Significant developmental changes have also occurred in practically every communist country including the Soviet Union. Most of these regimes have subordinated the secret police to the Party, i.e., they have made the police a component rather than opponent and master of the Party. Most of these regimes have done away with terror as a regular feature of Party control over society. I would argue that Khrushchev's appearance in the Soviet Union was as significant a change within Leninism as was Aquinas's appearance in Catholicism or FDR's in Liberalism.

Conclusions: Without the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union, most East European countries would remove their Leninist rulers, and at this point in their history adopt and be able to sustain a form of liberal democracy.

Since 1956 communist countries have demonstrated a significant capacity for internal change within the boundaries of their Leninist identity. These changes from terror based to coercive/material-based regimes have to varying degrees improved the personal, social, and cultural environments of the people in almost all of these countries. In a paradoxical but understandable fashion some of these improvement have also increased the level of popular dissatisfaction with these regimes.

As a direct descendant, though not mere imitator, of Khrushchev, Gorbachev, and his policy of Glasnost, will or could further enhance the civil if not civic rights of the ruled in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

3. What does Gorbachev want from Eastern Europe? Presently Gorbachev is not commanding each East European regime to indiscriminately emulate his words or deeds. To begin with he has the traumatic lessons of the 1950s to remind and scare him of how disruptive and potentially disastrous the consequences of imposing Soviet priorities on Eastern Europe can be. Second, he has clearly concluded that his efforts at domestic reform in the Soviet Union require placid not turbulent international environments. Gorbachev does not want to see increasing ANC/Afrikaaner violence in South Africa, or increasing Iraqi/Iranian/American violence around the Straits of Hormuz. And he certainly doesn't want Hungarian-Romanian violence in Eastern Europe. Military violence enhances the power and status of those

whose competence and skill is violence, namely the military; the very institution most closely tied to the Brezhnev political legacy Gorbachev is attacking.

At the moment (and things can/do change) Gorbachev can be more rather than less reassured by what he sees in Eastern Europe. This is a relative statement, relative to the highly "faulted" nature of regimes in Eastern Europe--none of which can be considered legitimate, all of which can be considered repressive, and very few of which are even seen as tolerable by their populations.

Still, looking at the Party rulers in Eastern Europe, and not in the first instance at their populations, Gorbachev finds more support than opposition to his intended reforms in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. That all these regimes, especially the East German, are cautious and selective in their commentary in no way denies their basic support of Gorbachev's program. Even the Romanian regime wholeheartedly supports Gorbachev's arms proposals for Europe. And while the Bulgarians like the idea of "acceleration" and don't like the idea of glasnost they pretend to like it which means their opposition is covert not overt. It appears there is unanimity among East European specialists that Gorbachev's glasnost reforms pose the greatest threat to the Husak regime in Czechoslovakia. There is good reason for this consensus. However, I see no reason not to assume that Gorbachev is as aware of the Czechoslovak problem as are Western academics. If I am right that Gorbachev is pursuing a selective and discriminating approach to Eastern Europe then his recent visit to Czechoslovakia may well have been more of a political counterpunch to those in the Czechoslovak party who are opposing him and his initiatives than a political uppercut to the Czechoslovak regime by way of demanding that it "fall in line."

Conclusions: Gorbachev's intended reforms in the Soviet Union (and ultimately in Eastern Europe) do have the potential to unsettle and possibly convulse some East European regimes. Some East European leaders are more wary (e.g., Ceausescu, Husak, and Zhivkov); some are less wary (Kadar, Honecker, Jaruszelski); and all are a bit wary of what the Gorbachev leadership is about.

Gorbachev is as aware as Western academics that Eastern Europe is a "faulted" region. In light of the ambitiousness of Gorbachev's intended reforms it is important to take note of the sober, measured, and differentiated manner in which he approaches Eastern Europe. It may not work, but it is the only Soviet reform approach that might.

To the extent that Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union take root THEN Eastern European regimes will indeed be faced with a less "understanding" and more "demanding" Soviet Union. However, if those "demands" are in the direction of less secrecy and more publicity (though not publics), and greater dispersion of power within the Party (not to those outside the Party) then both the human rights and political atmosphere in these countries will significantly improve (though the long-term consequences of such reforms may indeed prove to be DEstabilizing).

In the short run, the more successful Gorbachev is in the Soviet Union in achieving his reform ends the less likely he is to follow a highly activist policy for reform in Eastern Europe. The less successful his efforts are in the Soviet Union the more likely he is to mobilize allies in Eastern Europe and consequently the more likelihood of political turbulence both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

Right now Eastern Europe is "on hold," waiting to see what comes out of the Party Conference the Soviets plan to hold in 1988. This CPSU conference could potentially be the most important Soviet political event since 1920, and 1956.

4. Compared to the alternative of an increasingly militaristic, ethnically nationalist Soviet regime, Gorbachev's success would be a positive thing for the Soviet population, for Eastern Europe, and for the West.

A successful Gorbachev regime will emphasize political and economic forces relative to military and ethnic forces in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, and internationally. I consider that good.

If Gorbachev succeeds, relations between Western and Eastern Europe are going to be less compartmentalized, more "open." Relations between the United States and Western Europe will undergo a corresponding revision in which a greater premium is placed on political and less on military relations. If Gorbachev should succeed it would not mean a more "dangerous" Soviet opponent except to hysterics who always think the United States and Western Europe are such hedonist and indulgent creatures that only a technological and ideological SDI like "condom" can protect us from Soviet "Aids." As an American--not just an academic--I consider any success Gorbachev has with "glasnost," a gain not only for the Soviet and East European populations but for the U.S. in its political and ideological contest with the Soviet Union. Our often unrecognized, somewhat shriveled, but potentially overwhelming advantage in that contest has always been the value we place, the experience we have, and skills we have developed in overt, public, political engagements and rivalry. That's what democracy is about and what we are about nationally and when/where possible internationally.

It would be an historical perversion if the U.S. became more rigid and "closed" as the S.U. became less rigid and more open.

5. Gorbachev: 1834 and 1920

However, Gorbachev's success is doubtful. So far his reform efforts have found support in: the visibly embarrassing incidence of political corruption within the CPSU; Chernobyl as a traumatic indictment of Brezhnev's corrupt legacy; and the landing of a Cessna in Red Square as an added indictment of Brezhnev's rule in the very realm where it was supposed to have achieved most--the military. It is questionable how much more "luck" of this kind Gorbachev can stand.

Gorbachev faces two apparently nonbiodegradable problems, one in the Soviet political economy, the other in the Soviet polity. Like practically every other Leninist ruler Gorbachev's economic problem is analogous to England's in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. At that time English capitalism was tethered by its refusal to create a free market for labor. The result, as Karl Polanyi so brilliantly pointed out, was a hybrid economy that worked at cross purposes. In 1834 the policy of subsidizing labor, known as the Speenhamland system, was ended, and England's economy integrated along consistently capitalist lines.

Today the Soviet, Hungarian, Chinese, and Yugoslav command economies have in their different fashions added elements of decentralization, marketization, and private enterprise; without, however, providing these elements with a stable institutional base of support. In effect these Leninist economies are "Speenhamland like" in their institutional (and cultural) inconsistencies. In a critical respect this means that very often these countries get the worst of both "planned" and market economies; they get parian, not entrepreneurial, capitalism, and corrupt political, not efficient, managerial administration.

Politically, Gorbachev is considering a radical reform of the communist party. I believe he has in mind a return to the pre-1920, pre-Kronstadt organization of the Party, one that allowed for the presence of factions; or at a minimum the presentation of competing policies within Party organizations. Equally radical, Gorbachev wants to upgrade the regular party membership at the expense of the professional party apparatus. This "Lutheran" threat to the indelible priestly status of the party apparatchiki is precisely what brought about Khrushchev's downfall.

For Gorbachev to revise the Soviet Party's 10th Congress ban on factions would be an historic act, and one he is unlikely to accomplish in the absence of several "Chernobyl like" indictments of the Brezhnev legacy he and his party companions have inherited. As for the Soviet Union's "Speenhamland like" political economy, it is equally unlikely that the Gorbachev or any other Leninist leadership will make the leap from an economy with market elements to a market-economy. What we are likely to see in the Soviet Union then is a long-term series of symbolic, substantial, and indecisive reforms in response to recurring and intense instances of both economic stagnation and political corruption that sooner or later produce a regime emergency (i.e., something more than the sense of urgency current among part of the Soviet elite today) with all the unpredictable and possibly violent changes inherent in such a situation.

6. On Romania

Under Gorbachev, the Soviet attitude toward Romania has been a mixture of embarrassment, fear, and prudence.

There is ideological embarrassment at the "socialism in one family" mode of Ceausescu's rule. In the last several years this rule has taken on an increasingly "Pharaonic" quality with Ceausescu's attempt to create a number of "eternal" monuments (e.g., canals, ports, roads, subways) to his rule.

The Soviets have clearly but prudently made their ideological concern manifest by the presence of their ambassador, the ideological expert, Tiazhelnikov; and by their refusal to recognize the status accorded in Romania to Ceausescu's wife, the "walida" Elena.

There is also fear or at least apprehension on the Soviets' part: a well-founded fear about the potential for political convulsion in Romania. Romania must be considered along with Czechoslovakia as the most obvious (if not the only) candidates for internal disruption in the near future. In the presence of a natural disaster like the earthquake that occurred in the 70s, any sign of disarray within the Party leadership, or near famine conditions in some area(s), Romania could well be the site of an urban jacquerie, an outpouring of violence and rage as frightening and murderous as the 1907 peasant jacquerie in Romania.

One must discard the superficial notion of Romanian servility. Someone certainly failed to tell the Romanian peasants in 1907 they were servile, or for that matter Romanian troops in World War II. What makes Ceausescu's oppressive rule possible is not some Romanian "passivity gene." What makes his oppression possible is the absence of any point of leverage against his rule. For over twenty years there has been an absence of discernible factions in the Romanian communist party. The Romanian Orthodox Church is not the Polish Catholic Church and has no political or doctrinal base for opposing the regime. There is no substantial group of Marxist scholars in Romania with the credentials to even esoterically critique regime policy. And the only source of regional diversity (Transylvania) tends to unify ethnic Romanians around the regime, not against it.

In this context the Soviet position has been quite sober and correct. They have begun providing more in the way of energy supplies to ameliorate the condition of the Romanian population. This is consistent with Gorbachev's general desire to avoid international turbulence and his specific desire to avoid an urban jacquerie in Romania with its possible spillover into a direct national-regional confrontation between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania.

The issue of Most Favored Nation for Romania can be addressed here. Romania is my Least Favorite Regime. The question I ask is whether or not withdrawal of this status (MFN) will contribute to a social convulsion in Romania comparable to that not in Poland in 1[illegible], or Czechoslovakia in 1968 but to a popular movement of rage like that in Hungary 1956. Such a movement of rage would be largely uncontrolled and threaten not only the party despots in Romania but also raise the threat of inter-ethnic and regional confrontations between Hungary and Romania. It is difficult to believe that the limited economic impact connected with withdrawing MFN status could be the trigger for such a convulsion and therefore in light of the political, cultural, and individual indignations, privations, and misery imposed by this leadership on its people MFN should be withdrawn.

MFN does not provide the major base for American influence with Romania. That has come from the Romanian regime's desire to enhance its autonomy from the Soviet Union. In withdrawing MFN I do think the U.S. should be every bit as sober and prudent in its statements as are the Soviets. We should demonstrate with its withdrawal our disavowal of the Ceausescu regime but not do or say anything to even indirectly instigate turbulence in Romania, a turbulence that we could do nothing to resolve--but whose consequences we would have to deal with.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Professor.

I didn't hear the first part of your presentation, but I got the drift of the second part of your presentation, and I appreciate it very much.

At this time, I'd like to now ask Professor Terry to make her presentation.

Ms. TERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As always, Ken is a tough act to follow, but I'll try.

In your letter of invitation, you asked that we address three issues—the impact of past Soviet successions on East European stability; the prospects for Soviet-East European relations under Gorbachev; and, third, the implications for U.S. policy.

In the written statement, I have tried to do this. In these remarks, I'm going to confine myself to the second issue, with particular attention to Poland.

Chairman HOYER. Without objection, I am going to include the full written text, as I am sure Senator Lautenberg has indicated earlier.

Ms. TERRY. Yes, I understand that.

I am not going to be reading the entire section. But for those of you who wish to follow me, it begins on page 4.

Two years into Gorbachev's rule, it seems to me that he does not yet have a coherent, internally consistent policy towards Eastern Europe.

What he does have is a set of initiatives, a wish list if you will, that can be summarized in the same three themes or slogans that dominate his domestic policies—"glasnost," "perestroika," and "uskorenie."

Each of these, however, has certain nuances that give it a more complex meaning in the East European environment. Each has also evoked rather varied responses within the region.

By now, "glasnost," or openness is, to my mind, a rather overworked term. It stands for Gorbachev's calculated campaign to expose the ineffective and corrupt policies of his predecessors and their bureaucratic holdovers. As such, it is aimed not only at shaking up the entrenched establishment in the Soviet Union, but also at mobilizing the energies of an alienated and apathetic population for the goal of economic revitalization.

In urging "glasnost" on his East European counterparts, Gorbachev's initial motives were essentially the same—that is, to move the bloc as a whole out of the lethargy and stagnation of the past two decades.

We do now see a new twist to "glasnost" in Eastern Europe. That is, within the past few months, Gorbachev has shown a growing awareness of the need for more candor on the topic of Soviet-East European relations themselves—this apparently as a means of overcoming the intense anti-Soviet feelings prevalent among the populations in question, and as a prerequisite for strengthening intra-bloc relations in the future.

Thus, during his April visit to Prague, Gorbachev did make references to the difficult lessons of 1968.

Later that month, he signed a declaration with Polish leader General Jaruzelski which included a pledge to examine the so-called "blank spaces" in Polish-Soviet relations, a formulation that seems to open the way, at least in the minds of some Polish historians, for reopening such taboo subjects as the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact or even the 1940 Katyn Forest massacre of Polish military officers.

With respect to "perestroika" and "uskorenie," in Eastern Europe, as in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev uses these terms to suggest the need for a restructuring of economic and political systems and an acceleration of the pace of economic growth and technological progress.

At the same time, these slogans have an additional meaning for Moscow's junior partners—namely, a restructuring of the mechanisms and an acceleration of the pace of economic integration within CMEA, the overriding purpose of which will be to facilitate modernization of the Soviet economy and to lessen the dependence of all East European, all CMEA members, on Western technology.

It seems to me that this second meaning is of more immediate importance to Moscow than the first.

So, despite expectations that Gorbachev would move rather quickly to replace some of the aging East European leaders with younger men who might be more inclined to follow his lead, we see Gorbachev as rather flexible, if sometimes brusque, in his dealings with the Brezhnev era holdovers.

On the other hand, he has been aggressive, very aggressive, in imposing his economic priorities both in the multilateral framework of CMEA and in bilateral relations.

High on his list of demands in bilateral trade are East European deliveries of more and better quality machinery and consumer goods in exchange for stable or, in many cases, reduced Soviet deliveries of energy and raw materials.

He is also demanding a balancing of trade and a repayment of outstanding ruble debts.

The ambitious CMEA integration plan, which was pushed through in December 1985 despite some reservations on the part of the East Europeans, and which has since been supplemented by numerous specialized agreements between the U.S.S.R. and each of its smaller partners, provides for new, large-scale, joint investments in Siberian resource development and comprehensive coordination, under Soviet direction, of scientific research and development.

It also foresees the establishment of direct links between existing Soviet and East European enterprises, as well as the creation of new joint ventures.

That the reaction to Gorbachev's initiatives has been mixed is hardly surprising.

One of the ironies, as the Chairman pointed out at the very beginning of the morning, is that the most enthusiastic response often has been at the popular level and among some dissident groups, who see Gorbachev as expanding their scope for bringing increased pressure to bear on their own governments.

On the other hand, at the official level, and with the lone and interesting exception of General Jaruzelski, the reactions range from restrained endorsement (barely distinguishable from lip service) to outright rejection and hostility.

The most obvious reason is that today's Brezhnev era holdovers are understandingly reluctant to criticize the policies for which they have been responsible for up to two decades. But it seems to me that the sources of the restraint go beyond a distaste for "samokritika."

One is the memory of the turmoil and failed reform attempts that accompanied past Soviet successions, and thus a reluctance to become too closely identified with a Soviet leader who may not last.

A second source is a concern that, while change is long overdue in the Soviet Union, the pace and the intensity of Gorbachev's drive for openness and restructuring is inappropriate and potentially destabilizing for Eastern Europe—that it will open up a Pandora's box of old wounds that the regional parties have worked long and hard to keep closed—and that it will revive popular pressure for more radical political as well as economic reforms than either these parties or Gorbachev himself would be prepared to tolerate.

A third source of official East European reticence, especially among economists, is a growing realization that the various items on Gorbachev's wish list are at times mutually incompatible and, at best, entail painful opportunity costs for the East Europeans.

For instance, demanding improved trade performance and better quality exports *now* may undermine prospects for meaningful reforms in the longer term.

Second, diverting Eastern Europe's limited supply of so-called hard goods to Soviet markets will reduce hard currency earnings that otherwise could be used to repay debts and to import the very Western technology that is needed to bring about the increased efficiency and product quality that Gorbachev wants.

Perhaps most painful of all is the prospect that the ambitious program of joint investments, joint ventures, and direct enterprise links will lock the East Europeans into another round of capital intensive investments that have proved so ineffective in the past, at the same time preempting scarce resources for goals defined largely in Moscow at the expense of long neglected domestic needs that could serve the interests of their populations.

In brief, Eastern Europe's leaders, whether we're talking about today's incumbents or the new generation that will emerge in most of these countries within the next few years, face a much tougher, more determined taskmaster in Mr. Gorbachev than they did in Brezhnev.

Gorbachev's policies will be more subtle, more intelligent, in some respects more flexible. Unlike Brezhnev, he will press for reforms and for more active and effective policies of social mobilization. But the bottom line is unlikely to be liberalization as we would understand it.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, Gorbachev is not a man who intends to preside over the dissolution of his empire. Far from allowing a loosening of ties within the Warsaw Pact/CMEA alliance, his intention is to strengthen them through restructuring.

Now, let me take the last few minutes I have here to mention briefly some recent developments in Poland. These are of particular interest not only because they highlight the dilemmas and opportunity costs facing all of the East European regimes to one extent or another, but because I think they may provide some clues to the Soviet leader's long-term political strategy toward the region.

For the moment, it's not really clear whether he is treating Poland as an exception because it is so crisis-ridden and so troublesome, or whether he is treating it as a kind of laboratory.

Should the pattern emerging in Poland be extended to other countries in the bloc, however, it will involve not only accelerated economic integration, but a vastly expanded network of political, cultural, and ideological ties.

I will mention only a few aspects of Soviet economic policy toward Poland.

Just as the other countries will participate in joint investments in the Soviet Union, so will Poland in the Yamburg gas pipeline. It's also going to ship a steel rolling mill, originally purchased for installation in Poland, to the new Soviet steel complex at Magnitogorsk.

The more interesting part of Soviet-Polish economic relations is that the Soviet Union is also going to participate in a number of investments in Poland. These are mostly investments that were started in the 1970's and halted or, as the Poles say, "orphaned" in the Solidarity period because they were perceived as wasteful and unnecessary.

They are now being re-started with very substantial contributions in both ruble credits and sometimes in dollar credits from the Soviet Union.

The problem with these projects is that they are going to perpetuate a pattern of industrial development based on the same capital- and energy-intensive smokestack industries that have proved unprofitable for Poland in the past. Thus, they can only impede the process of reform that both Jaruzelski and Gorbachev say they favor.

They will contribute in a very substantial way to a worsening of Poland's already tragic environmental problems. They are inconsistent with the need to restructure Polish industry to make it more efficient and competitive on world markets, measures that are urged not only by Western experts and the IMF, but by Jaruzelski's own economic advisors.

And I think it's not too much to say that the primary rationale for these projects is that they fit very well with Soviet needs.

The most novel dimension of Gorbachev's policy toward Poland, however, is political. Here I am referring to the wide-ranging declaration on Soviet-Polish cooperation in ideology, science, and culture that was signed during Jaruzelski's April 1987 visit to Moscow.

There is perhaps a temptation to dismiss statements of this kind as little more than obligatory bloc rhetoric that doesn't really mean anything in the long term. But I think in this case the scope of the planned cooperation, and the speed with which some key aspects have been initiated, indicates that Gorbachev really means business.

It covers not only the usual scientific and culture exchanges, but the whole gamut of social, educational, and professional activities, with very heavy emphasis on programs among the youth and the responsibility of the media.

On page 11 of the statement, I have quoted some paragraphs out of the declaration. I'm not going to take the time to read them here.

Let me just make a few comments on what I see as Gorbachev's motives and the possible repercussions of this program.

On the one hand, it strikes me as a rather subtle blend of "glasnost" in Polish-Soviet relations; that is, there seems to be a willingness of the part of the Soviets to open up some of these taboo subjects like Katyn. But it is also a kind of damage control operation.

In this respect Gorbachev's approach is very different from Brezhnev's after the 1968 Prague Spring.

Brezhnev seems to have believed that the key to limiting ideological and political erosion within the bloc was control over the individual Communist parties. That is, if *he* kept *them* more or less in line, *they* would maintain control over their domestic situations.

The vexing experience of Solidarity proved that strategy mistaken, at least in Poland. And now Gorbachev is responding with an approach that promises to keep a finger on Poland's pulse by engaging broad sections of the population in a web of contacts and exchanges.

On the other hand, the Gorbachev approach may prove as risky as it is bold. I'm beginning to think that he's perhaps lost his marbles, that he doesn't understand what he's doing.

Should these programs materialize as envisioned, he will be doing something that every Soviet leader since Stalin has explicitly tried to avoid—namely, exposing large numbers of the Soviet population, especially Soviet youth and some of the non-Russian, even anti-Russian Soviet nationalities, to a Western oriented, fervently Catholic, free-thinking Polish society.

It could also backfire on him in Poland, perhaps even undermining the tenuous political support Jaruzelski presently enjoys.

Candid discussions about "blank spaces" in Polish-Russian relations may be welcomed among historians. But it seems to me they are more likely to rekindle than assuage popular anti-Soviet feelings.

If the discussions prove less than candid, if there is an attempt to whitewash the past, this will only confirm the Poles in their distrust of Soviet intentions.

Similarly, Polish schoolchildren and students, already impervious to and resentful of the watered-down political indoctrination they receive in their own schools and youth organizations, will, I think, deeply resent being lectured to about their joint responsibility for the "revolutionary legacy" by Soviet student activists.

With respect to these programs toward youth, I think that it's not unlikely that the Pope's unexpected outspokenness last week in Poland was at least in part a response to these programs—that he sees these programs as Gorbachev's challenge, as Gorbachev's indication that he is not going to concede the next generation of Poles to the Catholic Church. The Pope is responding in kind, and very likely there is going to be a fallout in church-state relations in Poland as a result of that visit.

Perhaps the most threatening development to Jaruzelski's position—and I will conclude with this—is the growing disenchantment one sees among Polish economists and other intellectuals over the General's apparent eagerness to go along with a package of integration programs that they see as largely detrimental to Poland's long-term economic and political stabilization.

[Prepared statement of Sarah M. Terry, Associate Professor of Political Science follows:]

Prepared Statement of Sarah M. Terry, Associate Professor of
Political Science, Tufts University

for

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
June 18, 1987

GORBACHEV, 'GLASNOST' AND EASTERN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Commission:

Pursuant to your letter of May 14, 1987, this statement will address three issues: (1) the impact of past Soviet successions on Eastern Europe; (2) the prospects for Soviet-East European relations under Gorbachev, with particular attention to Poland; and (3) the implications for U.S. policy toward the region.

1. Succession and Political Stability in Eastern Europe

By now it is widely understood that Soviet succession politics tend to have a destabilizing effect on Eastern Europe. The fact that the November 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary occurred three years and eight months after Stalin's death, and the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia three years and ten months after Khrushchev's removal, may represent nothing more than odd coincidence. The evidence suggests, however, that the political uncertainties that characterize a change of leadership in the Kremlin increase the probabilities of miscalculation by one or more East European parties as to how much autonomy or systemic diversity Moscow will tolerate. It is not simply a question of a new Soviet leadership being preoccupied with domestic affairs, but of the dynamics of the succession process itself: the inevitable jockeying for position among competing factions in the absence of an institutionalized mechanism for the transfer of power, the equally inevitable policy shifts as factional alignments change, and the pervasive opaqueness of Soviet political discourse temporarily masking or distorting those shifts. In these circumstances, the mechanisms of consistent policy guidance between Moscow and the regional parties tend to break down, opening the door to contradictory signals or sudden changes in policies affecting Eastern Europe. While only those countries already experiencing domestic turmoil and dislocations are likely to be severely destabilized, neither the record of past succession periods nor the present situation in Eastern Europe can provide much comfort either to Gorbachev or other Warsaw Pact leaders.

The rapid-fire shifts in Soviet policy in the three years following Stalin's death in 1953--the Moscow-initiated "New Course," Malenkov's defeat in the "second industrialization debate" and the simultaneous retreat from the "New Course," followed by the beginnings of de-Stalinization with Khrushchev's secret speech and the reconciliation with Tito (both seemingly legitimizing the idea of "separate roads to socialism" and the autonomy of socialist states--had a whipsaw effect on the more vulnerable East European regimes. In Hungary, in particular, Malenkov's removal as Soviet premier in February 1955 combined with Khrushchev's temporary alliance with the Kremlin hardliners, left the hapless Nagy, the reform-minded premier installed less than two years earlier at Moscow's insistence, at the none-too-tender mercies of Rakosi, the ultra-Stalinist party leader who had himself barely escaped forced removal in June 1953. By the time the Kremlin leadership recognized its mistake, removing Rakosi in July 1956, the frustrated aspirations of Nagy's countrymen for a more humane form of socialism had boiled over into unacceptable demands for democracy and independence. In the end, the combination of the immediate threat to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and the potential repercussions of the Hungarian events on Khrushchev's personal position in the Kremlin made a military solution inevitable.

In the other major crisis of 1956, Polish party leaders were more successful in avoiding the kind of direct Soviet meddling that led to the roller-coaster of hope and despair in Hungary. Nonetheless, encouraged by de-Stalinization in Moscow and under growing domestic pressures, they too pushed for a greater degree of autonomy and liberalization than the Kremlin was willing to countenance. That confrontation ended without the use of military force, but only barely. And it was probably only the stark object lesson administered two weeks later by the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolt that kept the Poles--and perhaps others--from pressing their demands further.

Although the specifics differ, an analysis of events leading to the invasion of Czechoslovakia twelve years later reveals broad similarities in the impact that the post-Khrushchev succession had on that country. Much as the "New Course" had influenced Nagy and his supporters, the quasi-populist mood of the last years under Khrushchev followed by the reformist signals emanating from Moscow in the first years of what was then called the Brezhnev-Kosygin era--in particular, the 1965 economic reform usually associated with the name of Premier Aleksei Kosygin--gave rise to exaggerated expectations among Czech reformers concerning Moscow's tolerance for change in Eastern Europe as well as the direction of developments in the Soviet Union itself. While it is true that the power struggle in the wake of Khrushchev's removal was more muted than the one following Stalin's death--and that there were no sharp reversals of policy, such as had occurred with the "New Course" and with such devastating effect on Hungary--the initial quiescence of the conservative faction around Brezhnev only served to magnify the illusion that a moderate "reform" faction had emerged, or was about to emerge, victorious.

It is also important to keep in mind the reverse impact that developments in Eastern Europe can have on an internal power struggle in the Soviet Union. Just as the Hungarian crisis, as "Exhibit A" in the hardliners' case against de-Stalinization, became a potential obstacle to the consolidation of Khrushchev's power in 1956, so in 1968 the generally perceived threat to Soviet-style socialism posed by the Prague Spring reforms became a potent weapon in the conservative faction's resistance to less radical reforms in the Soviet Union. As Czech reformer Zdenek Mlynar wrote later: "The Kremlin 'hawks' were able to use the problem of democratization in Czechoslovakia as a key issue in resolving the power conflicts inside Moscow at that time. They were consciously exploiting what they felt was an extremely opportune issue for them." In this way, the Czechoslovak reformers, initially encouraged by similar if more limited tendencies in the USSR, ultimately influenced the Soviet power struggle to their own disadvantage.

Gorbachev is undoubtedly aware of this past pattern of misperception and miscalculation, as was Brezhnev before him. Indeed, Brezhnev's policy toward Eastern Europe throughout the 1970s was aimed in part at averting a repetition of the miscalculations that led to the Czechoslovak crisis. With Poland as a continuing reminder of the potential for regional instability, the new leadership has already shown itself to be highly sensitive to the problem. At the same time, and despite whatever precautions the Kremlin may take, the probability that the "succession factor" will again play an unsettling role in Eastern Europe--and that any resulting instability there will reverberate back on the outcome of the leadership and policy struggle in Moscow--remains high. The most obvious reason is that the prospects for Gorbachev's policies within the bloc are closely linked to the success or failure of the political and economic changes that he is trying to bring about at home. A second factor is the depth and complexity of the social and economic problems confronting most of the East European countries, where stagnation and a progressive deterioration in the overall quality of life are sapping the already fragile legitimacy of these regimes, and where Gorbachev's initiatives are not always compatible with the solution of underlying domestic problems. Still a third complication is the prospect of multiple and more or less simultaneous successions in Eastern Europe, where four of six party leaders are in their mid-70s (Honecker in the GDR, Husak in Czechoslovakia, Kadar in Hungary, and Zhivkov in Bulgaria), and a fifth (Ceausescu in Romania) is reportedly in declining health. The last two factors in particular will put great pressure on these regimes--especially on the new leaderships as they emerge--to test the limits of Soviet tolerance in their search for more effective ways to meet the needs and aspirations of their own populations.

2. "Glasnost" and Eastern Europe Two Years into Gorbachev's Rule

Slightly more than two years after assuming the post of CPSU Secretary General, Gorbachev does not yet have a coherent, internally-consistent policy toward Eastern Europe. What he does have is a set of initiatives--a "wish list" if you will--that can be summarized in the same three themes, or slogans, that dominate his domestic policies: glasnost, perestroika, and uskorenie. Each has evolved nuances that give it a more complex meaning in the East European context; each has also evoked varied responses in the region, both among countries and, within individual countries, among different audiences. Following some general comments on the main trends in bloc relations since March 1985, as well as the dilemmas they pose for the East European leaderships, this section will focus on recent developments in Polish-Soviet relations.

Glasnost, or "openness," by now an overworked word for Gorbachev's calculated campaign to expose the ineffective and corrupt policies of his predecessors and their bureacratic holdovers, is aimed not only at shaking up the entrenched establishment but also at mobilizing the energies of an alienated and apathetic population for the goal of economic revitalization. In urging glasnost on his East European counterparts, Gorbachev's initial motives were essentially the same--that is, to move the bloc as a whole out of the lethargy and stagnation of the last two decades. But now a new twist has been added. Within the past few months, the Soviet leader has shown a growing awareness of the need for more candor on the topic of Soviet-East European relations themselves (or at least about past relations)--this apparently as a means of overcoming the intense anti-Soviet feelings prevalent among the populations in question, and as a prerequisite for strengthening intra-bloc relations in the future. Thus, during his April 1987 visit to Prague, the Soviet leader referred obliquely to the "difficult lessons" of 1968. Later that month, he signed a declaration with Polish leader General Jaruzelski on cooperation in ideology, science and culture, including a pledge to reexamine the "blank spaces" in Polish-Soviet relations--a formulation that seems to open the way for a reopening of such sensitive issues as the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact that led to the re-partition of Poland or the 1940 Katyn forest massacre of Polish military officers.

In Eastern Europe, as in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev uses perestroika and uskorenie to suggest the need for a radical "restructuring" of the economic and political system and an "acceleration" of the pace of economic growth and technological progress. At the same time, these slogans have an additional meaning for Moscow's junior partners--namely, a "restructuring" of the mechanisms and "acceleration" of the pace of economic integration under CMEA auspices--the overriding purpose of which will be to facilitate modernization of the Soviet economy and lessen the dependence of all CMEA members on Western technology. Clearly this second meaning is of more immediate importance to Moscow than the first. Thus, despite expectations that he would move quickly to replace several of the aging leaders with younger men who would follow his example (Zhivkov and Husak were thought to be in greatest danger), Gorbachev has been surprisingly flexible (if sometimes brusque) in his dealings with the Brezhnev-era holdovers. He is careful not to suggest that the revamped model of Soviet socialism he envisions will be obligatory for the others; he also freely admits that several East European parties are well ahead of the CPSU in adapting their domestic systems, and that the Soviets can learn from their experience. On the other hand, he has been aggressive in imposing his economic priorities, both in the multilateral framework of CMEA and in bilateral relations. High on his list of demands in bilateral trade are East European deliveries of more and better quality machinery and consumer goods in exchange for stable (or even reduced) deliveries of Soviet energy and raw materials, a balancing of trade and repayment of outstanding ruble debts, in most cases by 1990. The ambitious CMEA integration plan, which was pushed through in December 1985 despite East European reservations, and which has since been supplemented by numerous specialized agreements between the USSR and each of its smaller partners, provides for new and large-scale joint investments in Siberian resource development, and comprehensive coordination under Soviet direction of scientific research and development. It also foresees the establishment of direct links between existing Soviet and East European enterprises, as well as the creation of new joint ventures.

That the reaction to Gorbachev's initiatives has been mixed is hardly surprisingly. Ironically, the most enthusiastic response has been at the popular level and among some dissident groups. The spectacle of Czech intellectuals eagerly reading Pravda, and appealing to their government to stop censoring a Soviet leader's speechs in the local press, is not one we've come to expect. Nor are we accustomed to seeing East Berlin rock fans chanting "Gorbachev, Gorbachev" as their own police bar them from watching a rock concert on the other side of the wall. In Poland, Solidarity activists tend to be more skeptical, but some express a belief that "Gorbachev is our best hope for real reform here."

On the other hand, at the official level--with the lone exception of Jaruzelski, the only East European leader who has wholeheartedly embraced all three of Gorbachev's themes--the reactions range from restrained endorsement (often indistinguishable from mere lip-service) to outright rejection. The most obvious reason is that today's Brezhnev-era holdovers are understandably reluctant to criticize the policies for which they have been responsible for up to two decades, much as the "little Stalins" of the 1950s resisted the "New Course" and de-Stalinization for fear of incriminating themselves. But the sources of the restraint go beyond a simple distaste for samo-kritika. One is the memory of the turmoil and failed reform attempts that accompanied past successions and thus a reluctance to become too closely identified with a Soviet leader who may not last. A second is a concern that, while change is long overdue in the Soviet Union, the pace and intensity of Gorbachev's drive for "openness" and "restructuring" is inappropriate and potentially destabilizing for Eastern Europe--that it will open up a Pandora's box of old wounds that the regional parties have worked long and hard to keep closed, and will revive popular pressure for more radical political and economic reforms (including a loosening of bloc ties) than either the regional parties or Gorbachev himself is prepared to tolerate.

A third source of official East European reticence--especially among economists--is the growing realization that the various items on Gorbachev's bloc agenda are at times mutually incompatible and, at best, entail painful opportunity costs. To mention only the most obvious: demanding improved trade performance and better quality exports now may undermine prospects for meaningful reforms in the longer term; reorienting Eastern Europe's limited supply of so-called "hard" goods to Soviet markets will reduce hard-currency earnings that otherwise could be used to import Western technology needed to increase efficiency and product quality. Perhaps most painful of all is the prospect that the ambitious program of joint investments, joint ventures and direct enterprise links will lock the East Europeans into another round of capital-intensive investments that have proved so ineffective in the past--at the same time, preempting scarce resources for goals defined largely in Moscow at the expense of long-neglected domestic needs, and leaving domestic reform hostage to the success of Gorbachev's perestroika in the Soviet Union. One of the things that it not yet clear is whether the Soviet leadership has not thought through the conflicting implications of its various demands on Eastern Europe, or whether contending factions are working at cross purposes.

In brief, Eastern Europe's leaders--whether the incumbents or the new generation that will emerge in most of these countries within the next few years--face a much tougher and more determined task-master in Mr. Gorbachev than Brezhnev ever had any pretensions of being. His policies will be more subtle and intelligent, in some respects more flexible; unlike Brezhnev, he will press for reforms and more active and effective policies of social mobilization, but the bottom line is unlikely to be "liberalization" or "pluralism" in the Western sense of those terms. Most importantly, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, Gorbachev is not a man who intends to preside over the dissolution of his empire. Far from allowing a loosening of ties with the WTO/CMEA alliance, either political or economic, his intention is to strengthen them through "restructuring."

Poland: special case or Gorbachev's model for Eastern Europe's future? In the context of Gorbachev's evolving strategy toward Eastern Europe, recent developments in Polish-Soviet relations are of particular interest, not only in the sense that they highlight the dilemmas and opportunity costs facing all of the East European regimes, but because they may provide clues to the Soviet leader's long-term strategy toward the region. For the moment, it is not clear whether he is treating the troublesome Poles as an exception or a model. Should the pattern emerging in Poland be extended to other countries in the bloc, however, it will involve not only accelerated economic integration but a vastly expanded network of political and cultural ties as well.

That Poland should be a prime target of Gorbachev's attention is no surprise. From Moscow's point of view, Poland is geographically the most strategic of the USSR's East European allies, the sine qua non of Soviet influence and power-projection into Central Europe. It is also the largest and most populous country in the region, the richest in natural resources and heavy industry, and home to the second largest army in the Warsaw Pact. Above all, it is the least stable and most crisis-prone of Moscow's junior allies. The opposite side of the coin is Jaruzelski's susceptibility to Soviet blandishments. There is no question that, among East European leaders, Gorbachev has shown a definite favoritism for Jaruzelski; this was evident both at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986 and at the Polish party congress in June of that year. The reasons are in part substantive--shared policy preferences--and in part a matter of style. But the important point to remember is that Jaruzelski is uniquely vulnerable to Soviet pressure; for him there is no alternative to total support for Gorbachev's "new political thinking." The reasons are partly economic, partly political, and partly psychological.

Economically, Poland's massive debt, economic isolation and inability to expand its exports to the West have increasingly forced it to reorient its trade toward the East, and especially toward the Soviet Union. Politically, Jaruzelski needs Gorbachev's support against his own entrenched bureaucrats and betony (literally "cement-heads" or hardliners)--support that was essential to carrying out last year's amnesty for political prisoners, the recent rapprochement with the Church, and initiating the proposed "second stage" of economic reform. Psychologically, Poland suffers from what might be called the "first ally complex"--i.e. the aspiration by virtue of size, strategic location and resources, to be the second most important power in the Warsaw Pact. Since the late 1960s, that position has been progressively eroded by the GDR--first economically, then militarily and, in the early 1980s, even politically.

This psychological factor is especially important now. It is a question of national pride, and of recouping Poland's influence both within and beyond the bloc. Official Polish spokesmen constantly reiterate the "first ally" theme, while the Polish press is replete with references to the convergence between Gorbachev's "restructuring" and the Polish concept of "socialist renewal" (ironically a holdover from the Solidarity period). But the fact of the matter is that the Poles know they have a long way to go before they are again "first" in Moscow's eyes. In 1986, Poland dropped to Moscow's fourth largest trading partner within CMEA, slightly behind Bulgaria with less than one-third the population. Frequent references in the Western press (no doubt Warsaw-sponsored) to Poland's having the "best-equipped and trained army in Eastern Europe" are little more than wishful flashbacks to fading realities. What all of this does, however, is to make the Poles highly vulnerable to Soviet pressures to improve their performance--whether to increase military spending (which, despite Poland's continuing economic problems, rose by 15% in real terms in 1984 and by an estimated 9-10% in 1985), or to go along with Gorbachev's revitalized integration schemes.

In the area of economic cooperation, the new round of joint investments foresees Polish participation in the Yamburg gas pipeline, a new steel complex at Magnitogorsk, and other projects--for a total contribution of 650 million transferable rubles (TRs) and a Western-manufactured rolling mill originally purchased for Poland's massive new steel mill at Katowice. The Soviets will participate in the completion of a number of investment projects in Poland, most of which were started in the 1970s and halted (or "orphaned") during the Solidarity period; these reportedly include the Huta Katowice, several coal complexes, and shipyard modernization, for a total contribution of 675 million TRs and unspecified hard-currency credits. The problem with these projects (especially the "orphaned" ones) is that they perpetuate a pattern of industrial development based on the same heavy, capital/energy-intensive industries that have proved unprofitable in the past; thus they can only impede the process of reform that both Jaruzelski and Gorbachev say they favor, and will contribute to a worsening of Poland's already tragic environmental problems. They are also inconsistent with the need to restructure Polish industry to make it more efficient and competitive on world markets--as urged both by Western experts, including the IMF, and by Jaruzelski's own economic advisers. It is not too much to say that the primary rationale for these projects is that they fit very well with Soviet needs for large-scale infusions of the products of these traditional smoke-stack industries.

In addition, Poland and the Soviet Union have signed several ambitious agreements for new forms of economic cooperation, including: (1) direct links between producing enterprises and research institutes (more than 100 organizations on the Polish side and almost as many on the Soviet side have reportedly declared their interest); and (2) joint ventures (five were designated in February 1986, with seven more under discussion). The significance of these developments to date should not be overstated. With respect to direct links, the initial interest on the Polish side was due to the expectation that participating enterprises would have priority in the distribution of investment funds and access to hard currency. So far, this has not been the case. It is also becoming clear that the mechanisms for direct links do not yet exist on the Soviet side, leading to apprehensions that participation would mean subordination to giant Soviet production associations or central ministries. Similarly, progress on the joint ventures was slowed by the failure of a second, October 1986, agreement to clarify legal/institutional details or how costs and profits would be divided--both questions on which the Polish press has reflected some anxiety. In brief, we should expect to see a lot of talk and not too much action for a while, and much will depend on the success of Gorbachev's reforms. If the Soviets push these new forms of integration, however--and especially if their own reforms fail or end up as half-measures--the Poles have reason to fear that important parts of their economy will effectively become regional branches of Soviet industry.

The most recent and novel dimension of Gorbachev's policy toward Poland concerns the wide-ranging declaration on "Soviet-Polish Cooperation in Ideology, Science and Culture" signed during Jaruzelski's April 1987 state visit to Moscow. There is an almost automatic temptation to dismiss such declarations as part of the obligatory rhetoric of bloc relations with little impact on day-to-day relations. In this case, however, the scope of the planned cooperation, and the speed with which some key elements have been initiated, indicates that Gorbachev means business. The declaration covers not only the usual scientific and cultural exchanges, but the whole gamut of social, educational and professional activities with heavy emphasis on youth and the role of the media:

> Soviet-Polish cooperation must be the cause of millions of citizens. Conditions will be created for considerably widening contacts between people, families, labor collectives, scientific and cultural institutions, higher educational establishments and schools, and between USSR oblasts and Polish voivodships with twinning links.
>
> Both fraternal parties see it as their very important task to educate young people in the spirit of socialist ideals and responsibility for [our] revolutionary legacy. . . . Cooperation btween USSR and Polish youth organizations is intended to instill in the younger generation a feeling of respect for other peoples, for their honor and dignity. The achievement of this noble goal will be aided by increased contacts between schoolchildren and students, the organization of joint recreational and work camps, and the creation of conditions for expanding personal contacts between young people. . . .
>
> In expressing a high opinion of the media's role in bringing the Soviet and Polish peoples together, the CPSU and PZPR attach tremendous significance to the full and objective coverage of the life of the two countries in the spirit of wide-ranging openness. . . . Journalists are expected to write more articles revealing the inexhaustible potential of socialism . . .

Already in the two week just prior to and after the signing on April 22, there were at least four exchanges of high level delegations related to the new cooperation program: (1) A 5-day visit to Moscow by a delegation from the Central Committee cadres department of the Polish party to study the CPSU's experience in party and cadre work; (2) a visit to Poland by Pravda editor Afanasyev, including meetings with Jaruzelski and at the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences; (3) a Polish-Soviet conference on media responsibility and expanding cooperation between the mass media of the two countries; and (4) a meeting of the Polish-Soviet freindship societies, with the conclusion of still another agreement emphasizing work among youth and the need to popularize the Russian and Polish languages.

Clearly it is too early to do more than speculate on what impact this program may have on Polish life. On the one hand, it is a rather subtle blend of glasnost in Polish-Soviet relations (including an apparent willingness on the Soviet side to reexamine some previously taboo events from the past) and a kind of "damage-control" operation. In this respect, Gorbachev's approach is very different from Brezhnev's. After the Prague Spring, Brezhnev seems to have believed that the key to limiting ideological and political erosion in the bloc was control over the individual communist parties--that is, if he kept them more or less in line, they would maintain control over their domestic situations. The vexing experience of Solidarity proved that strategy wrong, at least in Poland. And now Gorbachev is responding with an approach that proposes to keep a finger on Poland's pulse by engaging broad sections of the population in a web of contacts and exchanges.

On the other hand, the Gorbachev approach may prove to be as risky as it is bold. Should these programs materialize as envisioned, he will be doing something every Soviet leader since Stalin has explicitly tried to avoid--i.e., exposing large numbers of the Soviet population (especially the youth and the non-Russian European nationalities) to a Western-oriented, fervently Catholic, free-thinking Polish society. It could also backfire on him in Poland, possibly even undermining the tenuous political support Jaruzelski presently enjoys at home. Most threatening to the Polish leader's position in the near term is the growing disenchantment among economists and other intellectuals over his apparent eagerness to go along with a package of integration programs that they see as detrimental to Poland's future economic and political stability. In the longer term, candid discussions about the "blank spaces" in Polish-Russian relations (Katyn for example) may be welcomed among historians, but they are more likely to rekindle than assuage popular anti-Soviet feelings. If the discussions are less than candid--if there is an attempt to whitewash the past--this will only confirm the Poles in their distrust of Soviet intentions. Similarly, Polish schoolchildren and university students, who are already impervious to the relatively watered-down political indoctrination from their own schools and youth organizations, will deeply resent being lectured to about joint responsibility for the "revolutionary legacy" by Soviet "student" activists (often _appartchiki_ in their thirties).

Indeed, the unexpected outspokenness of Pope John Paul II during last week's return visit to Poland was in all probability due to what he sees as an unacceptable challenge from Gorbachev over the future shaping of Polish society. By all pre-trip accounts, the Pope was expected to take a relatively low-key approach, in line with the strategy of "small steps" leading to full legalization of the status of the church--a first in church-state relations in any communist country--and his hope of visiting both Moscow and Catholic Lithuania during the 1988 millenniel celebration of Russian Orthodoxy. Instead, he embarked on an impassioned defense of human and political rights in general, and the validity of the Solidarity movement in particular, in the end evoking bitter attacks both in Warsaw and Moscow. The most rational explanation of his behavior is that he is not about to concede the next generation of Poles to Gorbachev's "restructured" version of socialism.

3. The Implications for U.S. Policy

The trends in Soviet-East European relations described above pose subtle challenges for U.S. policy. This section of my statement briefly addresses policy alternatives in light of past experience.

For approximately three decades now, the United States' approach toward Eastern Europe has been one of "differentiation." (I prefer to call it an approach rather than a policy since what it does is to provide the framework within which substantive policies are carried out.) The explicit goal of differentiation is to expand the options available to the East European countries by rewarding those governments that move toward domestic liberalization and/or foreign policy autonomy from Moscow. The "carrots" or rewards for such behavior include a variety of non-economic benefits in the form of cultural, educational and scientific exchanges. But the most coveted benefits are economic (MFN trade status, preferential credit treatment, increased access to U.S. technology, etc.).

On balance, differentiation has served us reasonably well, especially when we have kept our sights low and pursued moderate, incremental change. At the same time, it has several limitations that U.S. administrations have not always kept in mind. First, although in principle differentiation is designed to foster change, in practice it has been primarily a reactive policy. The sources of change in Eastern Europe are overwhelmingly domestic and subject to the limits of Soviet tolerance. With rare exceptions, the West cannot initiate change in the region; at best we can support changes that have already occurred. But even there, we are not always successful--witness Poland, where we could not prevent a reversal of liberalization in progress. Second, differentiation is most effective on the margins, on peripheral issues. When we try to use our leverage to alter basic elements of the system, we overstep the limits of our influence and the results are counterproductive Thus, the sanctions imposed on Poland following the declaration of martial law in December 1981 only made that country more dependent on the Soviet Union and, in my view, did more to hinder positive change than to promote it. Third, differentiation is difficult to implement consistently in a region as diverse and complex as Eastern Europe. Thus U.S. policy is frequently confronted with moral ambiguities--the most glaring of which in the recent past is that Ceausescu's neo-Stalinist regime in Romania continued to enjoy MFN status while Poland, which even under martial law was markedly more open than Romania, was denied it for four and one-half years.

In addition to these underlying limitations, U.S. policy is subject to both internal and external constraints that did not exist in the 1970s. The internal constraint is our own budget deficit and rising indebtedness. Externally, in the context of the overall world debt crisis, the United States has a natural and more immediate stake in some of our hemispheric neighbors, whose combined debt dwarfs that of Eastern Euorpe. Both factors will severely limit the resources available to back up policy toward the latter region. A second external constraint is Gorbachev's vision, discussed above, of a revitalized and restructured socialist bloc in which the network of political and economic linkages will be expanded and strengthened, leaving the East Europeans with diminished scope for domestic or foreign policy autonomy. That is, a "reformed" bloc would be more dynamic, but not necessarily "looser".

The limit on available resources does not necessarily mean that our leverage must be reduced. (Massive Western credits to Poland in the 1970s in the end gave us little influence over events in that country.) But it does suggest that we need to make better use of the resources we have: first, by identifying realistic goals that will contribute to positive changes in the lives of the East European populations; second, by better coordinating our efforts, not only among the various channels in bilateral relations, but also with our Western allies; and third, by eschewing frontal challenges to Soviet interests in the region that can only provoke Moscow to tighten its grip.

In the area of improving human rights performance--a primary concern of this Commission and of U.S. policy toward the region--I believe we can be more effective by emphasizing multilateral forums and initiatives than by explicitly linking human rights to other aspects of bilateral relations. No East European leader worth his "Order of Lenin" can risk being perceived in Moscow as making political concessions to gain preferential treatment from Washington. On the other hand, the East European leaderships have shown themselves increasingly sensitive to human rights issues in such forums as CSCE, where criticism comes from neutral as well as NATO countries and to which East European dissidents themselves are beginning to direct their appeals. Indeed, one of the most positive developments in Eastern Europe is the growing cross-border contact among opposition groups. In the past, long-standing historical and territorial conflicts and cultural differences bred a kind of Schadenfreude, or pleasure in the misfortunes of others, leaving the region as a whole vulnerable to outside manipulation and domination. We should welcome and encourage these contacts which demonstrate a recognition of their common problems and aspirations and a new willingness to support each other rather than looking exclusively--and separately--to the West.

Similarly in economic relations, we are likely to be most effective in encouraging necessary economic reforms and industrial restructuring by urging countries like Hungary and Poland to take maximum advantage of their membership in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. A conditioned IMF recovery program for Poland, for instance, offers the best hope for solving that country's staggering debt problem, and thus for a gradual normalization of its economic relations with the West, whereas scarce resources and the aftermath of U.S. sanctions on Poland severely limit our ability to impose unilateral conditionality. With such a recovery program is place, however, there would be a variety of avenues through which government-sponsored and private programs could participate in Poland's recovery with some assurance that assistance would be better used than the credits of the 1970s.

Potentially one of the most fruitful areas for East-West cooperation and Western influence on the quality of life in Eastern Europe is that of environmental protection. This is an area where economic and human rights concerns (Baskets II and III of the Helsinki Agreement) merge, and where East European needs are most urgent. This approach suggests a broadening of the traditionally political focus of our human rights policy, but it would be very much in line with the concerns of independent movements in Eastern Europe. In several of these countries, especially in the Northern Tier (Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia), where pollution has reached catastrophic proportions and now poses serious public health problems, environmental issues have drawn even with political rights as the number one issue for the opposition. To varying degrees, the governments also have begun recognizing the urgency of the situation and, while the commitment of resources is still meagre, are looking for solutions. This emerging confluence of interests offers us, together with our allies, an opportunity to help bring about a meaningful improvement in the everyday lives of the East European populations (as well as Western Europe where much of the pollution ends up). In doing so, however, we should again make clear to these regimes that, in return for technological assistance, we will expect a genuine commitment on their part, including corresponding changes in industrial policy and resource allocation.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Professor Terry.

And I want to thank all of you for what were certainly very interesting and candid and I think very complete discussions with reference to "glasnost," and Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev's relationship to East Europeans and East European leaders.

I don't know whether the other two of you—Mr. Ambassador, I did not hear your presentation. I didn't see it in your written presentation.

Professor Jowitt's observation was that Gorbachev's probability of success was poor.

I'd like to hear each one of you comment on that issue if you would.

Ms. TERRY. I would agree.

There are several ways of looking at this. One is whether or not he is going to survive as Secretary General of the CPSU. The second is whether he is going to be successful in carrying out his program.

I would definitely agree with Professor Jowitt that his chances of succeeding with his program are poor. He may survive as Secretary General of the CPSU, depending on the kinds of compromises he is willing to make with other elites, with those who are in opposition to his programs. We have seen this before in Soviet history. I would give him perhaps no more than a 50-50 chance there.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador, do you share that view?

Mr. GARTHOFF. Well, I think there are two dimensions of this question. One is the question of whether he will succeed in his overall attempt at revitalization in the Soviet Union. And the other is the particular aspect of relating all of this to policy toward Eastern Europe.

I think it's unlikely that he will succeed in all that he is trying to do in either of these areas. But I don't think it's an all-or-nothing question.

I think that he's taking some substantial risks. He's going very far in his reformation program at home in the Soviet Union as well as taking risks in policy toward Eastern Europe.

I don't think he will succeed in fully carrying through the program that he's pursuing.

We don't know whether he himself expects to fulfill it completely or whether he feels it's necessary to set rather far-reaching objectives in order to get at least halfway there, shall we say.

But there are risks in stirring up expectations which are not then satisfied.

I think he will not succeed fully with his program, but it's too early to reach a judgment as to whether he will succeed in keeping the program going long enough to make a substantial difference and to be able to consolidate it at that point.

Chairman HOYER. Professor Jowitt.

Mr. JOWITT. Yes.

Chairman HOYER. I was keying in on your observation. But if you would like to make an additional one, we would like to hear it.

Mr. JOWITT. Thank you.

Two things. First, Gorbachev has one very real advantage in staying in power. And that is it's very hard for the Soviets to find anybody to replace him.

For 3 years, I thought that the embalmers and the florists were the most important people in the Soviet Union, because the only people who were elected to the position of General Secretary died.

And I think the Soviets were both concerned——

Chairman HOYER. I'm going to copy down your phrases. They're great.

Go ahead.

Mr. JOWITT. I think that the Soviets were both concerned and embarrassed at the sight of a great power not being able to find a leader.

And, therefore, I think Gorbachev really is the common denominator that they could all agree on. And that gives him staying power.

I also think it's nonsense this notion that Ligachev is his opponent. People, academics in particular, like to think in dichotomized terms. If there's a leader, there must be an opposition.

I don't think there's any serious opposition at the top right now to him. I think Ligachev plays a complementary role.

But what really is important about Gorbachev's rule are the accidents that have supported him. In my mind, the single greatest ally Gorbachev has had is Chernobyl. Chernobyl helped Gorbachev more than any single thing in his attempt to stay in power.

If you look at the terms that have been used, restructuring, acceleration, openness, they're all there before Chernobyl. After Chernobyl, you start hearing about democratization, because Chernobyl was an objective, independent indictment of the entire Brezhnev legacy of incompetence, of ineptitude, of callousness, of everything.

I would suggest a political leader doesn't want to depend on too many Chernobyls to stay in power, or too many Cessnas, or too much corruption.

But, basically, the three things that have helped Gorbachev more than anything else are the corruption of the Brezhnev regime; the landing of a Cessna, which indicted the military; and Chernobyl.

So, while I do think he has staying power related to the fact that they find it very difficult to agree on anybody else, these sorts of accidental events, which have very uncertain consequences and implications, are not something that make Gorbachev very likely to feel confident about how far he can go.

Chairman HOYER. Well, Professor, let me make an observation.

I had recently, as you may know, the opportunity with Speaker Wright, and——

Mr. JOWITT. Right.

Chairman HOYER [continuing]. Majority Leader Foley, and Majority Whip Coelho, and Dick Cheney, the Chairman of the Republican Conference, and about 16 others to meet with Ligachev, Shcherbitsky, Dobrynin, Gromyko,——

Mr. JOWITT. Right.

Chairman HOYER [continuing]. and Gorbachev himself of course.

But I think—and there's a pretty broad philosophical, ideological spectrum included on that trip—that the conclusions that each of us drew are the same ones you just articulated with respect to Ligachev and even Shcherbitsky, who as one of the old guard carryovers has been posited as one of the low level opposition members that may exist.

And while there may be some differences, I would agree with you that I don't think Ligachev at this time perceives himself as an opponent.

Let me now turn to Senator Lautenberg.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to participate.

I'm a fairly new appointee, and very interested in the subject as I indicated.

I was waiting for the subject of Chernobyl to arise because I think you, Professor, called it one of the benefits. I think it was the cause, very frankly, even though there may have been—I don't remember the exact time sequence in terms of when "glasnost" was introduced as an objective.

The thing that I hear is that more than anything we see Secretary Grobachev as the Dr. Pritiken of the Soviet society that would like to reshape it.

We know that somehow or other these things always come back to where they were originally, even if you take a week or two, spend a lot of money, and reduce the shape and change the size, or reduce the size and change the shape, it eventually gets back to its natural formation.

The thing that I was curious about is, while our mission ostensibly is security and economic cooperation, underlying that for us, almost all of us I guess, is the value of the human rights that we see as integral to the process of developing serious geopolitical trade, et cetera, relationships.

Though we've been putting "glasnost" under the microscope here, does it really mean anything in terms of accomplishing a higher regard for the human rights issue or for human rights period in these countries that are part of the bloc, or is this a diversion? Are we talking about the nirvana that you never get your mitts on to put it crudely?

That is a question.

Chairman HOYER. Why don't you start, reluctant as you are?

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Timidly, huh?

Mr. JOWITT. I once read that the most difficult thing for Americans is public speaking, which really makes me un-American.

In any case, I don't think it's a diversion at all. I think it's a serious substantial change.

If I may give you an analogy from American life. There are two schools of labor relations in the United States. One was called Taylorism, which I saw in action as my father worked in a factory, where people came along and showed you how to use your shovel better. They didn't come down and talk to you, ask you what you thought, engage you in any terms, human or otherwise. They didn't respect you as a laborer. They simply were concerned with getting their time marked out and seeing how the hell they could make you produce more in 8 hours so that they could make more money. That was "Stalin."

Basically the change in the United States was with a man named Elton Mayo who came along and said, you know, we've got people out there. Elton Mayo didn't say I'm going to let the workers own the factory. He said we live in a capitalist society and I like it. The owners are going to own it. The stockholders are going to make the profit. And the workers are going to get paid salaries. But we're all going to do a lot better if we take into account that these workers are human beings, that they have opinions, ideas, talents, skills, and that those things have to be made available for us in order to improve the operation of the plant. That was "glasnost."

"Glasnost" is Soviet style human relations. "Glasnost" is a serious attempt, short of participation, to enhance the consultative rights of those people who don't hold power.

Now, one could say, well, that's just a sham, that that's just an image. If you compare it to political democracy, it is.

The Soviet Union is fundamentally a despotic, monopolistic polity. And it's not going to change. But within the confines of that I think Gorbachev recognizes two things.

Instrumentally, the Soviet Union is just going to hell. It is not working. There is enormous cynicism, apathy, and corruption, not only individual, but within the party itself.

And what he needs instrumentally is to engage the Soviet population in work that doesn't divert public resources to private ends. Therefore, he needs to recognize, just as American factory owners recognized, that you might get more work out of the population if you paint the walls a nice green, play music, and talk to them regularly like they're your friends. They aren't friends. But it changed the productivity in the United States. And I think it will change it in the Soviet Union.

The real danger I see, however, is that once you give the Soviet people the right to articulate you can't determine what they are going to say.

And, so, what I see happening is that while "glasnost" is viewed as only human relations by the Soviet leadership, the more it succeeds, the more it favors the types of development that took the form of Solidarity in Poland.

I don't care that the Russian Orthodox Church isn't the Polish Catholic Church, that agriculture is collectivized in the Soviet Union. You give people the experience of speaking about things that affect their lives in organized settings, and you tend to get spillover. People start making more and more demands.

Gorbachev does not believe it will happen. I think is inevitable.

So, I think "glasnost" is real. It is not a diversion.

Mr. **Lautenberg**. If there is——

Chairman **Hoyer**. I think Professor Terry——

Mr. **Lautenberg**. I'm sorry.

Chairman **Hoyer** [continuing]. Wanted to comment.

Mr. **Lautenberg**. Oh, please. Please. I'd appreciate any comment.

Chairman **Hoyer**. Well, or the Ambassador.

Mr. **Garthoff**. Yes. I'd like to briefly comment on this too.

I think, in the first place, that "glasnost" is not a diversion or a whitewash by any means. It doesn't involve and isn't likely to lead to some of the things we would like to see it lead to in the human rights field, particularly with regard to political rights, but also in a number of other respects.

But I think we ought to examine it from the standpoint of what it *is* doing. One can always say, yes, but there are still political prisoners, which is true in a sense. But there also was the release not only of Sakharov from being held in Gorky, but of several hundred other leading dissidents of various persuasions, that is, religious, nationalist, political, liberal and so forth.

Koryagin, for example, the foremost source of our information on psychiatric prisons has himself been released and started something of a campaign within the Soviet Union to end the practice completely.

Ten thousand members of the MVD have been released from service and a number of them put on trial for various infractions of the law in the conduct of their activities.

A few leading KGB officials have been sacked and publicly criticized. And also local party, regional party leaders who were responsible, in one case in the Ukraine, for an attempt to prevent and deal harshly with a reporter who began inquiring into an illegal action by the local KGB.

Particularly the area of culture the opening up which Professor Jowitt has referred to, and which is, I agree, not controlled or fully controllable, is one of the areas in which Gorbachev is taking, I think, a bigger risk than he himself realizes. But he's doing it. He is opening things up.

For example, a novel by a leading central Asian novelist Aitmatov, himself an atheist of Moslem background, has written a very powerful novel published recently, which includes philosophical arguments, in which the hero is a Christian. And his arguments are from a Christian standpoint.

The Georgian film "Repentence," which has been mentioned in the press here, I saw in Moscow with a Russian audience. And it is a very powerful film. It includes not only a strong indictment of the whole practice of autocracy and of the unleashing of political police, the regime of the camps under Stalin. It also raises the whole question of responsibility of the present generation of leadership. The central figure in the film, except for flashbacks, is not the despot from the 1930's and forties, but his son, who himself was not responsible for any of these excesses, but who's living on in authority that he had acquired on the foundation of that earlier despotism, and is keeping it hushed up.

And, incidentally, the third generation, represented by his teenaged son in the film, when he finally learns that his grandfather, whom he had known only as a kindly grandfather, turns out to have been a despot responsible for these things, and the fact that his father had never told him this and had, as I mentioned, profited in effect from that earlier period, while his mother was interested only in good living, leads the young man in the film to kill himself.

Well, I've heard young Russians arguing that that was a mistake in the film. That it suggests too much a despair on the part of this youngest generation, that the younger generation has to get in there and do something about it.

One other vignette from that film. A historic church had been torn down by the dictator, not as an anti-religious act particularly, although it obviously had that effect, but simply because it got in the way of something else he wanted to do. And toward the end of the film an elderly lady comes along and asks if that is the road to the cathedral, and is told, well, yes, this is the road, but the cathedral isn't there anymore. And she says: "What good is a road path without a church at the end of the path? "

Well, this sort of thing is permeating the cultural life in the Soviet Union today in a way that is utterly remarkable in comparison not only with the Stalin period, but also with the recent Brezhnev period.

Whether it will have the kind of favorable further effects we hope it will have, for that matter whether it will have the favorable effects that Gorbachev hopes it will have, which are not identical with ours, is something that remains to be seen.

But there is indeed a risk that it will get out of control from the standpoint of the present political leadership. We'll have to see.

Chairman HOYER. Professor Terry, did you want to make a brief comment, because I know Senator Lautenberg has——

Ms. TERRY. Yes.

Chairman HOYER [continuing]. Some other questions.

Ms. TERRY. I wanted to make a brief comment.

Chairman HOYER. And Congressman Smith does as well.

Ms. TERRY. I wanted to make a brief comment following up on what Ken said about "glasnost" equaling greater involvement via consultations rather than genuine political participation as we understand it.

I think that if you look at Poland today, not only in the Solidarity period, you see the potential for that getting out of hand.

Perhaps Poland is unique, or perhaps Poland is just the future of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We don't know.

But once that genie is out of the bottle—what you're seeing in Poland today is the enormous difficulty of trying to put it back in.

Jaruzelski, over the past 5 years or so, has made several attempts to setup consultative bodies that would act in the name of society.

However, what we see is his unwillingness to allow groups or organizations to appoint their own members to any of these bodies. They really are all designated by the regime itself. And, as a result, they have no credibility whatsoever with the population, which goes its own way, allies itself with the church, turns off entirely, or reverts into its own private lives.

The second very brief comment I want to make is that, in thinking about human rights in Eastern Europe today, we need to adopt a somewhat broader definition than is characteristic of both ourselves here in the United States and of those in Western Europe.

In many cases, the East Europeans today are politically sophisticated, politically aware. Under ideal circumstances, they would want genuine political participation. But before they can even be concerned about that, they have to think about the basic necessities of life, the quality of life. The situation is most disastrous in Romania, as Professor Jowitt has pointed out. But it has been deteriorating or at best stagnating in the other countries.

One of the most critical issues is that of the environment. This is a region which is facing environmental catastrophe, where levels of disease and infant mortality are rising, and life expectancy is falling. These trends are particularly true in the northern tier countries, but Romania is also very badly affected.

Poland is generally considered to be the most polluted country in Europe, possibly the most polluted country in the world.

One reason I emphasized economic problems, and Soviet economic policies toward Eastern Europe in my statement is because they are diverting resources towards Soviet-defined goals and because this is going to make it more difficult for the East Europeans to begin facing urgent domestic problems.

Chairman Hoyer. Thank you.

Mr. Lautenberg. Thank you.

You touched on something, Professor Terry, just now that—if we're looking at a policy of openness, using our words for convenience here, it does speak, in my view, to the opportunity for one to raise one's living standard, improve the economy, et cetera.

What does that do for us in our interests of elevating the issue of human rights per se?

If I can analogize. South Korea, despotic—almost fits some of the definition—despotic, monopolistic, corrupt, in terms of their government. But people are doing fairly well at an economic level.

Now, after the bellies are satisifed, for the most part, the demand arises for political freedoms that follow.

First. If this Soviet society, its related allies, opens up, I think we'll see a rush to the economic side of things.

The human rights issues will still be, in my view, on a backburner. And I'm trying to get the connection as we examine this, Mr. Chairman, with "glasnost" and the elevation of the human rights agenda to the level that we'd like to see it.

Have we abandoned the notion, among the three of you, that holding on, demanding a better concern for the human, and tying it into trade or military cooperation, is that—has that failed in your estimation? I mean is that never going to do it?

How do we get the Soviet Union there, the bloc countries, to lift the ban on free participation politically, functionally, et cetera? Does "glasnost" do it? Does it mean anything in that process?

We don't care about the political shifts there as long as it doesn't get more hostile and more dangerous for the world at large.

But what does it do to help us achieve a goal that we consider as a primary one?

Mr. Jowitt. Well, I think it does a great deal. If you look, Poles travel when they want to travel. Hungarians travel when they want to travel. East Germans are increasingly able to travel. Yugoslavs have been able to travel for a long time.

If you look at Eastern Europe, I would suggest to you that most people most of the time do not wake up in the morning and think about democracy. And that's true in the United States. I mean it's scary when you stop and think what most people think democracy is about here. We have it almost in spite of ourselves sometimes.

When you talk about human rights, I'm sensitive to the issue. I think it's important. But human rights don't exist independent of the social, familial, occupational concerns of the people in these societies.

I am very serious when I say that they are currently living in scavenger societies. They are indignant about the fact that they are not consulted in any real way, that they are not given any degree of autonomy in their workplaces, that they're not given any sort of recognition as citizens.

They're not going to be given political rights. But in the short run "glasnost" can be very positive if it means that people will not have to engage regularly in the black market, which they find offensive; will not have to rely entirely on rumors, which offends their maturity as people who can think about political things: "Glasnost" will improve the quality of their life.

However, the second thing is that "glasnost" will not stop there. In the short run, I think, without anything we do, and most of what we do has very little effect, that "glasnost" will decidedly improve the human condition of people living in Eastern Europe. It will take away the need to have to continually confront an inordinately duplicitous, secretive regime. And that's what "glasnost" is designed to reduce. In that sense, it's good. It's good for them. It's good for us. Because what it does is also create the potential for an articulate citizenry, which is good for us and bad for them. But that's what's going to happen.

Mr. **Lautenberg**. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. That was one of the answers. It's kind of enough. I just wanted to get some perspective on that.

And the thing that threaded through our three scholars' messages that surprised me is that I think each of you said that turbulence, turmoil, dissension, destabilization within these societies benefits us not.

Mr. **Jowitt**. I think that's right. I don't think turbulence does benefit us.

Mr. **Lautenberg**. Is there a point at which the internal disturbances—again, you know, can you keep these, the genie bottle thing, can you keep it contained, or does it overthrow a regime that inhibits any serious consideration of the human rights, the individual rights issue?

Ms. **Terry**. Let me put it this way. I think that instability does not benefit them and does not benefit us. Destabilization has not led to greater liberalization in the past in Eastern Europe. It has led to a crackdown to one degree or another.

Stability, however, does *not* mean status quo. It means these societies must change. And "glasnost" itself is not enough.

It may well be, as Ken says, particularly in Romania and to a lesser extent in some of the other countries, that they are very secretive.

You've had an awful lot of "glasnost" in Poland for a long time. It's one of the safety valves that they use to maintain control in that country. But unless the economic conditions begin to improve, unless the environmental conditions begin to improve, "glasnost" is not going to improve the quality of the lives of the people in that country.

Increasingly, you see as the most active concerns on the part of dissident groups in Eastern Europe questions of economic rights, environmental quality, and so forth, not necessarily the political rights.

Walesa himself says we are not going to be able to change and gain our political freedoms until we get this economy moving again, until we stabilize the economic situation. He's been saying that now for several years.

Chairman **Hoyer**. Congressman Smith.

Mr. **Smith**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Jowitt, although you pointed out that the population of Romania is exhausted, you did say that there is a very huge potential for unrest——

Mr. **Jowitt**. Yes.

Mr. SMITH [continuing.] And that currently the Romanian populist does not have the leverage to exercise that. Yet, you feel that somewhere in the very near future or perhaps long term——

Mr. JOWITT. Yes.

Mr. SMITH [continuing.] That leverage may materialize. What are you referring to?

Mr. JOWITT. I'm referring to the possibility of an accident. Let me try to spell it out briefly.

If you look at a place like Romania, what you have now is a very mixed population in Romania, peasant workers, workers who have become technicians, and engineers, and so on. It's a very, very hybrid sort of culture right now.

So, what you have is, on the one hand, what sociologists get overly enamored about. They show you how the skill level is going up. But while the skill level is going up, the mentality is very much the mentality of a peasant population—which is not an invidious comment. It's not bad or good. It's just that you have an unsettled people who have absolutely no outlets. There's no church "sanctuary." There's nothing like "samizdat." There's nothing like the de facto free zones that you might find in a Poland.

So, what you have, and I think the word is accurate, is an enormous amount of rage in Romania. Rage.

And you talk, you talk to people. If you know them well enough, they are willing to talk. They are filled with rage. They're not just walking around saying, well, you know, we've always been Romanians; we bend and the water rolls over us, it doesn't break our neck. They are filled with rage.

Now, the question is, what would provide leverage? One of three things. Disarray in the leadership, a natural calamity, like an earthquake, or a near famine condition in a part of the country.

And if you get one of those three things, let along two of those three things, and I am speculating, there's no way for anybody, anybody living there or anybody visiting there regularly to demonstrate this conclusively, I'm suggesting, given a fissure of that nature, with this rage, you would get a murderous outbreak in Romania.

And I know this goes against all the conventional wisdom that says the Romanians can put up with anything. Look, they've done it consistently for 15 years, since 1972, when Ceausescu began to think he was Kim Il Sung.

But I simply don't accept it. I have not been there now in 4½ years, 5 years, but when I was there, and it wasn't as bad as it is now, the people I talked to in rural areas, in backward areas, in developed areas around Ploiesti, I'm telling you, particularly among the young, were as full of rage as of despair. And that makes it a very unsettled situation.

It doesn't mean it's going to blow up. It will take some sort of disarray in the party, something like a near famine, which is not crazy. I mean Ceausescu has returned Romania to about the 13th century where every single province or county is supposed to be a self sustaining fief. You know, it's as if Alameda County, out where I live, had to provide all its own vegetables.

It's become—and I don't want to use too much cute imagery—but it's become a European "Central African Empire," where in effect you've gone back 100 years.

But the Romanian population is not the population of 100 years ago. It is a literate, it is a skilled, it is an articulate population.

And the disjunction between the reality of their social and cultural existence and their leadership I think provides very good reason for thinking that Romania is at least as fragile as Czechoslovakia. At least.

I know Czechoslovakia is "this week's pick." That it is the regime Gorbachev has to worry most about.

But I think Romania is very dangerous. And it is dangerous precisely because it also involves Hungary.

Mr. SMITH. Has "glasnost" meant anything in terms of Gorbachev getting involved in intra-Warsaw Pact spat's for instance, the potential for a Romanian problem spilling over into Hungary, as you indicated in your testimony? Has he tried to mitigate some of those problems?

Mr. JOWITT. Yes, I think he has. Again, there's no direct evidence. I don't want to give the impression that I know something that other people do not know in the sense of hard data.

But I have no doubt that in connection with the much more forthcoming attitude of the Soviets to provide goods to Romania, particularly energy, that the Soviets did ask for two things. One, a downplaying of Ceausescu's wife's role in Romania, which was immediately done away with as soon as Gorbachev left, and it was upgraded again. But the other thing was to talk to the Hungarians.

I mean the fact that Ceausescu sent Emil Bobu, who is the second most important person in the regime, to talk to Szuros is "direct" indirect evidence that Gorbachev is very frightened about what's going on and made that clear to the Romanians.

And, again, Hungary, everyone assumes that Hungary is just this nation of shopkeepers that's decided that they can't be nationalists because of '56, and, therefore, they're a nation majoring in economic production and trade. That's nonsense.

The latent nationalism in Hungary I think is extremely strong, again among the youth. And when you can't express yourself politically, you express yourself ethnically. And that's what they are doing with respect to Transylvania. That is one hell of a dangerous situation right now and Gorbachev knows it.

Mr. SMITH. When the Cessna, the stealth Cessna landed in Red Square, there was a cleanup or a major sacking of top Soviet military leaders.

One of the things I think that has not been focussed on in our discussions has been—do you think that—any of the three witnesses—do you think that this may lead to a change of Soviet policy?

As you well know, we have our war games vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, have always anticipated what their motives would be based on a very, almost unchangeable type of order of battle, you know.

Do you see any new kinds of war plans being developed in terms of conventional or perhaps nuclear as a result?

Does "glasnost" also mean revisiting their military posture?

Ambassador.

Mr. GARTHOFF. Well, two things. First, there are developments underway as far as Soviet military thinking is concerned which are potentially very important, and it still remains to be seen how far they will go.

But we have already seen signs of a greater flexibility and readiness, at least in principle, and we're beginning to see it now working out in practice, for example, on the question of verification in arms control, and the fact that Gorbachev is ready to accept and move forward on the basis of the zero option on intermediate range missiles, which was correctly judged a few years ago here to be something that the Soviets would not accept.

The Soviets have also been proposing substantial reductions in conventional forces in Europe. And I think we should take the initiative ourselves in the West in developing programs and proposals that we think would be in our interest, and in that way challenge and test the Soviets to see how far they are prepared to go.

Apart from questions of arms control, of potential significance is the fact that Gorbachev has kicked off, since his speech to the Party Congress a little over a year ago, the idea that a principle criterion for military requirements should be "reasonable sufficiency," which suggests and offers the possibility of reductions and perhaps of asymmetrical reductions in arms control, and even of some unilateral ones.

Now, I think that the change in the military leadership and in the internal administration of the military is a separate question. And the changes in the Ministry of Defense at the present time I think are more related to that situation.

Gorbachev I think had been satisfied for awhile to keep the older Marshall Sokolov as Minister of Defense. He was not creating any waves, and in that sense was satisfactory in the job.

But now that he's been removed and they reached down to pick the 18th ranking general, Yazov, to replace him, they've been emphasizing again the need for "restructuring" in the military. And what they seem to mean primarily in that respect is increasing efficiency, discipline, and readiness. In other words, simply shaking up and making more effective the administration of the armed forces.

And I think it's extremely unlikely that Yazov will be made a member of the Politburo. He may be made a candidate member. But when selected for the job he was only a candidate member of the Central Committee, so that he ranked about 400th or something like that in the political structure.

The main area of real interest to us in the first instance is what this potentially may mean in the arms control area.

I would like to say one thing more with respect to the question that we were speaking about a minute ago. And that is that I think it is in our interest, as well as in the interests of the East Europeans and Gorbachev, if there can be evolutionary change in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union for that matter, rather than revolutionary change.

It may in some ways appeal to us to see something dramatic happen, but I think that would be a shortsighted view on our part, because it would almost certainly engender repression in its wake, whether by Gorbachev or a new leadership. And the same in terms of what would happen within Eastern Europe either on the part of local governments and/or Soviet intervention in one or another form.

So, it will probably lead further in terms of both changes in the system and in improvements of human rights of the citizenry if the changes do continue, but if they proceed in an evolutionary fashion.

Mr. **Smith**. Mr. Chairman, I assuming an INF treaty, and a lessened nuclear deterrent, and if "glasnost" spills over into the military, and they begin re-thinking what has always been a very rigid posture, and order of battle, and the like, I think that the defense of NATO and the West could become more imperiled unless we can accurately anticipate what potential changes they may make.

I believe this is something that needs to be raised and thought about a little bit more.

I do have a few final questions, Mr. Chairman.

I, with the Chairman, recently returned from a trip to Prague. It was part of a Helsinki Commission trip. About 2 years I was in Romania, and was startled, frankly, by the intense spiritual hunger among the people, particularly among the young people.

We were told in Prague by a Father Maly, who is a charter member of the Charter 77 organization, that his work with the youth certainly has demonstrated that they are looking for answers, particularly in the area of religion and God.

What impact do you see that "glasnost" may have on raising people's hopes that there is something other than the materialistic world?

We know that as a result of the Helsinki accords much was engendered, including the creation of Charter 77, in Czechoslovakia.

It raised people's expectations, and "glasnost" certainly seems to be doing that.

Could you comment on how you think this may interface with the spiritual hunger and whether or not people will begin demanding more religious and human rights? The question is for any of our panelists.

Ms. **Terry**. It seems to me that you are quite correct in saying that this is going to raise expectations. We see that already in the sometimes openly enthusiastic way in which some dissident group have embraced the idea of "glasnost," and look to Gorbachev as perhaps providing leverage, a wedge that they can use against their own regimes.

As I say, it's not clear whether what has just been agreed to between Poland and the Soviet Union is going to be a model for Gorbachev's political initiatives toward the rest of Eastern Europe or not.

But certainly it's quite clear he wants to see a revitalized Socialist ideology, and he intends to try to impose that as the future model for Poland.

He is locking horns with the Catholic Church.

Now, maybe he is doing this in Poland because he wants to counter the impact of the Catholic Church, which is the only organization to which the younger generation turns; not all of the younger generation, some of them simply turnoff. They have become totally cynical. They have no interest other than trying to secure some kind of reasonable material life for themselves, hopefully outside of the system. They don't see that coming from within the system.

So, there's a tremendous amount of demoralization.

Gorbachev's hope, I think, is that his reforms will change that image of socialism for the younger generation in the Soviet Union and presumably also in Eastern Europe.

I do not think he foresees or wants any loosening of cultural and ideological ties between the Soviet Union and the East European countries. I think he wants to see them changed, but he wants to see them strengthened.

Chairman Hoyer. Professor Jowitt.

Mr. Jowitt. Several things. First of all, I would suggest to you that the obvious interest and involvement in religion that one sees in Eastern Europe and in parts of the Soviet Union in part is not entirely a healthy thing. Because it involves to some extent escapism. It is an escape into a world where you don't have to deal with the materially malevolent one that these regimes have created.

In one sense you could say any route that leads to God is good. And I'm not denying that entirely. But what I am saying is one has to understand the motive behind this.

It is a form of escapism. It's better than alcoholism. It's better than suicide. But it's escapism. And many of the religions that are gaining are religions that are indeed highly eschatological, millenarian, and that aren't really interested in dealing with day-to-day life. That's the first point.

The second point is there's a big difference between the Catholic religion and the Orthodox religion. The Catholic religion is a problem for Leninist regimes. And it's a problem for these regimes precisely because it has a doctrinal and a historical base outside of these countries which threatens their regimes sense of exclusive sovereignty. So, they're suspicious of Catholics.

The Orthodox Church is quite different. I would be willing to bet that in the short run you will find Gorbachev being much more tolerant of the Orthodox churches for a very real reason. They'll increase social discipline and ethics.

The fact of the matter is that you have East European populations now that increasingly don't know what the word ectitude means. They're forced to be corrupt. That's what I meant by a scavenger society. These are good, decent people being forced to act like scavengers and some of them take to it.

You have women at work who can't take care of their kids. You have kids growing up, becoming delinquents. And these regimes are aware of this. It's a growing problem from Albania to Cuba.

So, they see in religion a way of increasing the moral probity and rectitude of their societies, particularly if it's the Orthodox Church.

The third and final thing is that a policy of "glasnost" will, not intentionally, but unintentionally, paradoxically support one of the most remarkable things that has happened in segments of Eastern Europe society and that is of benefit to the West. And that is Eastern Europe, for example Solidarity in Poland might well give to the West a renewed appreciation of ethics.

I think Adam Michnik in Poland is one of the greatest figures in 20th century history. Solidarity was not just about higher wages, nor only about political freedom though in my mind, it was the greatest act of political freedom since the French Revolution. Fundamentally Solidarity was about a renewed sense of ethics and human dignity.

And I think "glasnost," intentionally or unintentionally, will contribute to a sense of ethics and its importance in human life in Eastern Europe. And to the extent to which there are more open relations between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, they may get some greater sense of what liberal democracy is from us, and we may be able to get a lot better sense of what ethics is from some groups in their societies.

I'm talking about from their population.

Mr. SMITH. You sound like Solzhenitsyn, in terms of ethics.

Just one point I'd like to make here.

Mr. JOWITT. I'd like to avoid Solzhenitsyn. Nevertheless, yes, in a limited but real sense.

Mr. SMITH. When you talk about escapism, I'm sure you don't mean it necessarily in a pejorative sense, because they are escaping from a fatalistic point of view to one that has meaning.

Mr. JOWITT. Yes.

Ms. TERRY. I have to disagree on one point with Ken. That concerns the role of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe and, to a certain extent, the role of the Evangelical Church in the GDR.

These are churches which I do not think foster escapism, particularly under this Pope.

His primary concern in Poland is improving the social and political climate. Not when he visits other parts of the world; but, if you note, when he goes to Poland, he doesn't talk about abortion and birth control. What he does talk about is human dignity, human rights. He is very much concerned with the day-to-day lives of the Polish population.

This spills over, has spilled over into the spirit of the Catholic Church in some of the other countries, including in Lithuanian within the Soviet Union.

The Catholic Church has taken under its wing cultural activities, enriching the cultural life.

In Hungary, it has addressed issues of social concern, of alcoholism, of drug abuse, of other social problems, juvenile deliquency within the population.

The Evangelical Church in the GDR has done some of the same things.

They are also very much concerned about the environmental question.

So, I think it does play a role as an alternative forum for dealing with these very acute day-to-day problems.

Mr. SMITH. One final question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. For the record, your disagreement with Professor Jowitt was agreed to by Professor Jowitt.

Mr. JOWITT. I was speaking about more of the——

Chairman HOYER. Yes.

Mr. JOWITT [continuing]. Fundamentalist sort of religious, and not the Catholic and Evangelical. I agree entirely with Professor Terry.

Mr. SMITH. One final question. We all know the President has called on Secretary General Grobachev to tear down the Berlin Wall. How do you think he will respond to that?

Mr. GARTHOFF. I wanted to comment on a couple of the other questions.

Mr. SMITH. Sure.

Mr. GARTHOFF. But taking this one first, I think the odds are that he won't. But it's not entirely out of the question that he might.

I think there'd be a remarkable political payoff to him, a greater one since the President's challenge, if he were to do it. But the likelihood is that they would feel that the risks involved would still be too great.

Let me note through that, for example, last year, slightly over one-half million East Germans traveled West. And well over 99 percent of them returned to East Germany. So, we shouldn't think that this is something where they're all being cooped up.

The young people who chanted "Gorbachev" the other day, to take the Wall down, was because they wanted to get over closer to the rock concert which was just across the Wall in West Berlin, not because they were in general trying to move west.

And, so, I think it's just barely possible that he would take that gamble, but on balance not likely.

I wanted to comment that I think Gorbachev's own expectation and belief is that Leninist socialism as he conceives it will hold its own, is superior, and will hold its own against religion, and against Western political ideas.

I think he's wrong. But that's what he believes. And I think that's why he has the kind of confidence that helps lead him to being prepared to open up and take the risks at home in uncontrolled openness in the press.

Soviet editors have remarked privately that they find it somewhat a heady experience, but also a very difficult and trying one, that they have to make decisions themselves now, on what to print in many cases, that censorship is now strictly a question of really avoiding military secrets and the like, and that a very wide range of leeway is now given.

Now, that of course means that sometimes they may make mistakes. But, at the same time, they do have opportunities for permitting things to appear in the various organs of the press. And several journals where the editors have been willing to take bigger chances have become really quite interesting to read.

Only if one has spent any time in the past in working in this field and known the drudgery of having to go through the Soviet press, which was always uniform and said practically nothing, can one appreciate the difference where you can pickup a journal and find several new and interesting things in it. And that's true for Soviet citizens as well, of course, as for people abroad following the Soviet press.

On the question of religion, I might just remind us that next year is the millenium, the 1000th anniversary of the bringing of

Christianity to Russia. And it will be celebrated in the Soviet Union. I think they will do this in terms treating it more as a historical phenomenon rather than celebrating the message of the church today.

But, as has been mentioned, they have already, in a sense, to a large extent made their peace with the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union and in some of the countries in Eastern Europe on the basis of the kind of platform where there is a common interest. I mean it is on peace, disarmament, on working to improve the environment, on a number of such things where there is a common ground.

And a last comment. You mentioned that perhaps "glasnost" would involve some greater dangers and risks for the West, for NATO. I think that's only true if we let it be, in a sense. That is, Gorbachev is more flexible and more nimble, and that poses a certain challenge for us. And if we don't handle it right, it may indeed lead to divisions within the West which are to one or another degree debilitating.

But I think if the Western alliance, the Western powers respond to this by taking initiative ourselves, thinking through and advancing the kind of positions that would be in our interest, we won't be in a position of simply having to respond, and perhaps in less than a unanimous or orderly way. We can and should do something to establish our own military, and political, and arms control posture so that we are not caught off balance.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Unfortunately, I have a lot of questions and we don't have any time.

But let me ask you in closing. You are aware, of course, that the mandate of this Commission is to oversee implementation and observance of the Helsinki Final Act. One of the baskets, by the way, has already been heightened in this hearing. And that, of course, is the second basket, which we are criticized by the Soviets and by ourselves sometimes as not giving as much attention to as the other baskets.

The other of course is the security basket, which is getting a lot of attention.

We respond to the Soviets' criticism of focussing "too much" on human rights, by indicating that it is this area in which we see the most desultory performances.

Now, my question is: In light of "glasnost," and our focus on Eastern Europe, what do you think the United States can do and what do you think this Commission can do to utilize "glasnost," or enhance our effectiveness with respect to human rights?

The Commission is travelling. We have been to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We will be going, as I said, to Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria this last summer and early fall.

In Hungary, I urged them to heighten their communications with the Soviets on how important the United States views the human rights performance. What opportunities do you see for us both as a nation and as a commission in getting this message across?

Tough question. You may want to reflect upon it, but I'd like to hear your thoughts now.

Mr. Jowitt. If I may make three points.

One. We have an advantage now. And the advantage is the populations of Eastern Europe for the first time in their history have become modern. That is to say they're concerned with questions of individualism, individual efficacy, individual self-conscious. They are no longer peasant nations. They have become modern in the sense of individuals, which means that it's not simply our agenda, human rights, it's their agenda.

And their own regimes recognize that in order to be effective as ruling regimes they have to in some way allow for the recognition that the social and cultural nature of their countries has changed.

So, that's an advantage to us. We're not simply dealing with rulers. We're dealing with populations that in effect have become fully European.

Second. The major thing the United States can do is let West Europe do more with Eastern Europe. That's the major thing.

First of all, it's less threatening. Second of all, it's more proximate. Third of all, it's more desirable in the sense that East Europeans look to West Europeans.

We may think everybody wants to be in New Jersey, Maryland, California, and New York, but they don't. They want to be in Paris.

And I suggest that the best thing that we could do would be to emphasize the abilities, opportunities for increasing exchanges of every kind between West Europe and East Europe.

And that means, third, taking advantage of every possibility to diminish the role of military forces in West Europe and East Europe in favor of a political environment.

This country is crazy at times. We have a distinctive advantage in the world. And it is not technological, as the Japanese have shown. It is not military, as the Soviets have shown. It's political. We are a nation that is political. We have political skills, experiences, institutions, practices.

And the fact of the matter is we want to take advantage of the fact that we've got a politician nation for God's sake.

We keep thinking we have to have Secretaries of State who cultivate foreign accents.

There's nothing wrong with, in effect, our using what we have as skills. And our skills are political. And those will enhance the human rights of Eastern Europe by, in effect, making the contest one we can win.

Not some vague notion of freedom or democracy—public politics. That's what we're good at.

And I'm suggesting the extent to which we diminish the military function in NATO in return for them diminishing the presence of their conventional forces as well as others in Eastern Europe we open up access between East Europe and West Europe. And that's going to do more for the human rights of those populations than any single thing.

We should present ourselves as engaged in a contest with them that's political, not military, not technological. I'm not denying those elements. I'm not saying rule them out. I'm saying make them secondary.

Western Europe culturally is our greatest ally in enhancing the human rights of Eastern Europe.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. GARTHOFF. I would say, first of all, there are two ways one can approach the whole question of human rights in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and Soviet Union.

One is to exploit it for purposes of political confrontation with the Communist countries. The other, as I'm sure the Commission pursues, is to seek to actually improve the situation, to ameliorate it. And here I think one must approach it from the standpoint of doing what is doable, and doing the most that can—helping to accomplish the most that can be accomplished, rather than looking at it in all or nothing terms.

I think we should consider more the effects of indirect measures, of the impact of increasing contact with the West, rather than seeking to have all of the results up front.

By the same token, I think that quiet diplomacy, including the very useful consultations that the Commission has in Eastern Europe, are a more effective measure than posing it as a propaganda issue.

I agree with Professor Jowitt's suggestion that we encourage or at least not grumble about it when the West Europeans do more. And I would even suggest that perhaps we ought to act a little more like the Europeans do in this process.

To mention, for example, a point that Senator Lautenberg had asked for comments on earlier and that I don't think we got around to replying, I think we have deprived ourselves of the opportunity for some leverage by imposing the Jackson-Vanik amendment and Stevenson amendment, and these are being counterproductive to their purpose.

During the period before that amendment was adopted, and through the period in 1979 when the U.S. Government told the East Europeans and the Soviets in particular that they were considering seeking a change in the legislation, as you know there was an efflux of over one quarter million Jews from the Soviet Union. We all know that it has been a tiny trickle ever since.

We may have felt better about it perhaps in taking a tough stand. But I would suggest that the results have been counterproductive from the real purpose. And I'm not saying that it wasn't a very genuine purpose on the part of most of the people who thought that it would be a useful form of leverage. But I think that with the benefit of being able to judge what has happened over this period it is appropriate to re-evaluate it.

None of the Western European countries impose such restrictions on their ability to use their economic leverage. And that's one of the reasons—not the only one—that they are in a more effective position to influence the situation there than we are.

And, finally, I think on the subject of arms control if the United States would resume the position of leadership in this area that we held for many years, and would be seen in Europe, West and East, as serious and consistent advocate of arms control on a balanced and verifiable basis, we would improve our standing over a situation where we have put that into question by such actions as a self-serving, unilateral attempt at re-interpretation of the ABM treaty, and other moves that have raised questions that are reflected in polls.

For example, you've noticed I'm sure in recent days reports of polls that suggest that in Western Europe—and I think this is also true in Eastern Europe—we are letting Gorbachev appear to be a more sincere advocate of arms control than we are. I think he is. I think we are or should be as well, and that we can resume a position of leadership in this area if we are more consistently advocates, not only in word but in deed, in this area as well.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

Professor Terry.

Ms. TERRY. Yes. Two quick comments.

I think that in promoting better human rights behavior on the part of the East Europeans that we will be more effective if we emphasize multilateral initiatives and forums as opposed to trying to link those issues to other aspects of our bilateral relations.

Here I have in mind the Vienna review conference going on now. We have seen that the East European leaderships, as well as the Soviet leadership, have shown themselves to be increasingly sensitive to their poor image in this area and have been somewhat more forthcoming than they had been at past review conferences.

There is another development in Eastern Europe itself which has not yet been mentioned and which I think is a very interesting one and one that we should encourage. That is the growing relations and contacts among dissident human rights and peace groups within Eastern Europe and their linkages also to similar groups in Western Europe.

So often in the past one of the things that has weakened human rights and dissent in Eastern Europe has been the fact that there has always been a kind of "schadenfreude" among the East European countries. That is, they always took a certain amount of pleasure in the troubles of the others.

There has been a long history of bad relations among East European peoples. Now one sees a growing recognition, particularly on the part of intellectuals, that they really are all in the same boat, they do have common interests.

There was a joint declaration signed by East Germans, Poles, Czechs, as well as Hungarians on the 30th anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian uprising last year. I believe that it was belatedly signed also, at great personal risk, by three Romanian intellectuals.

There was also, I believe, a joint appeal sent to the Vienna conference on questions of human rights sometime in the latter part of 1986.

That this is a development that we should encourage. The idea that they are now looking to each other, gaining strength from each other, rather than simply looking to the West for some solution to their problems is very positive.

Chairman HOYER. I want to thank you, Professor Terry, for that answer, and thank all of you for your presentations today.

I think this has been a very, very interesting hearing. I'm going to try to do something we usually don't do. I'm going to ask the staff to put together a "Reader's Digest" type of approach to the hearings and see if we can get the members to perhaps focus on some of the very important things that have been said here this morning.

My own view is that it's a very exciting time for those of us in the West to come up with ways of exercising our political skills to further the objectives that we sought in Helsinki and other foreign policy objectives.

Your testimony, observations, and scholastic expertise have been very helpful I know to me and I'm sure to others. And, so, we thank you very, very much for appearing.

I also want to again thank Jan Petersen, Mr. Witer, and Mr. Sengun from the North Atlantic Assembly for visiting with us. I hope they have found the hearing interesting.

I want to say Professor Jowitt, Professor Terry, and Ambassador Garthoff that one of the things we are doing in the North Atlantic Assembly is trying to energize and cooperate with other NATO nations who are formulating parliamentary, CSCE type organizations toward the objective of making more multilateral and broader the human rights emphasis, as well as the emphasis on the other two baskets of the CSCE accords. So that I think we're all in synch on one of the important ways that we can further the objectives that we seek.

And I think we should reiterate the confidence that we have in the fact that we're on the right side of the issue. Therefore, the more we expose others to that, particularly as those societies becoming more modern and seeking more information and intellectual alliance, the better off we'll all be.

I want to say that—and I know I'm going on here a little bit, but you have spurred some of my notes—one of the great controversies that we've had over the last 18 months in dealing with cultural exchanges has been the ABA's agreement to deal in some sort of formal way with the Soviet Bar Association.

We don't think the Soviet Bar Association reflects the kind of legal representation in the West that we think individuals should be accorded. We believe it's a state organization not an independent one of individual justice-seeking lawyers.

Nevertheless, it has been my advice to those who have asked, that the interchange is a useful one, that there are those who are not, anymore than most human beings find themselves to be, in lock step with others, and, therefore, there's a reason to reach out.

You have in some instances corroborated my thoughts on that. And therefore I think they're good thoughts. All of us have that tendency I suppose.

I want to thank all of you. I want to thank our parliamentary friends and, as always, thank Congressman Smith and Senator Lautenberg for their attendance.

Senator DeConcini is very sorry that Senator Kennedy asked him to—I don't think he's sorry that Senator Kennedy asked him to chair the hearing—but he's very sorry that this morning's hearings were scheduled contemporaneously with one another.

Thank you all.

[The hearing was adjourned.]

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